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BREAKING AND ENTERING INTO PRIVATE PREMISES TO
EFFECT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE:
Dalia v. United States
INTRODUCTION
In the past several years federal courts have been faced with the
controversial issue whether law enforcement officials may covertly enter private
premises to effect an electronic surveillance order.' This broad inquiry
comprises three separate issues. The initial issue is whether authorization
covertly to enter2 the home or office of the surveillance target to install or
remove eavesdropping devices can be implicitly derived from any source. Three
potential sources of authority have been suggested: the federal electronics
surveillance statute, 3 some other statute, or an inherent judicial authority
independent of statute. If authorization for covert entry does in fact exist in any
of these sources, the second issue is whether such entry is reasonable under the
fourth amendment. Finally, if covert entry is indeed reasonable under the
fourth amendment, the third issue is whether the court-authorized surveillance
order must give explicit permission for such secret entry, or whether the
permission for covert entry is implicit in the court's sanction of the surveillance
itself.4
1. Surveillance may be accomplished by either wiretapping or eavesdropping.
"Wiretapping" refers to the interception of telephone conversations. "Eavesdropping" or
"bugging" involves intercepting conversations not transmitted by wire. The tapping of a
telephone wire can be accomplished without physical penetration of the premises, but
planting an eavesdropping device typically requires actual intrusion into private
premises. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE
LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, 1 COMMISSION HEARINGS
43-44 (1976) [hereinafter NATIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION].
2. As used in this Comment, covert or surreptitious entry will include entry
achieved by force (such as breaking and entering), by ruse, or by strategem.
3. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) [hereinafter referred to as Title III]. The courts have
given conflicting answers to the question whether Title III implicitly authorizes covert
entry. Compare United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
929 (1979) (remanded for further consideration in light of Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S.
238 (1979)) (Title III does not give judges the power to authorize breaking and entering,
and in the absence of specific statutory power judges do not have that power under the
fourth amendment) and United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated,
441 U.S. 939 (remanded for further consideration in light of Dalia v. United States, 441
U.S. 238 (1979)), rev'd, 600 F.2d 1317 (1979) (Title III does not permit courts to authorize
break-ins to plant eavesdropping devices) with Application of the United States, 563 F.2d
637 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title III implicitly authorizes covert entry, but the entry must be
specifically sanctioned by the court issuing the surveillance order).
4. Compare United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (surreptitious entry
must be authorized expressly and particularly to ensure compliance with the commands of
the fourth amendment) and Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977)
(covert entry must be specifically sanctioned by the court) with United States v. Scafidi,
564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978) (express authorization of
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The Supreme Court examined these issues in Dalia v. United States5 and
held that Title III implicitly gives federal agents authority for breaking and
entering into private premises to carry out an electronic surveillance order; that
the fourth amendment does not per se prohibit such covert entry; and that a
surveillance order need not include specific permission for covert entry. This
Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Dalia in light of the three
issues presented above. The arguments made in the Circuit Courts of Appeal
prior to Dalia and earlier Supreme Court decisions will be presented to show
that the Dalia decision represents a serious erosion of traditional fourth
amendment protections.
I. DALIA v. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
In 1973 Justice Department officials, pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), sought a court order
authorizing them to intercept conversation taking place in petitioner Lawrence
Dalia's business office.6 After finding that there was probable cause to believe
that the petitioner was participating in a conspiracy to steal goods being
shipped in interstate commerce,7 the district court issued the surveillance
order.8 In 1975 Dalia was indicted on five counts charging that he had been
involved in a conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric. Before trial,
Dalia moved to suppress any evidence obtained from the electronic surveillance
of his conversations. At the suppression hearing he proved that FBI agents had
executed the surveillance order by secretly entering his office through a window
and installing an electronic listening device in the ceiling. The petitioner
contended that the court order authorizing the electronic surveillance did not
explicitly authorize the covert entry. Petitioner's motion to suppress was denied.
The district court concluded that a secret entry to install surveillance
equipment was not unlawful under Title III merely because the court issuing
the order did not explicitly authorize such covert entry. Rather, the district
court stated, authority to enter the premises covertly was implicit in the court's
order to conduct the surveillance.
covert entry is unnecessary) and United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1976)
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978) (court's express sanction of covert entry is not required).
5. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
6. Id. at 241.
7. Such a conspiracy is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976).
8. The district court also found reason to believe that Dalia was using his business
telephones to further the conspiracy and that it would be difficult and dangerous to
investigate the conspiracy by any means other than electronic surveillance. 441 U.S. at
241-42. At the end of the time covered by the original order, the court granted the
government's request for an extension of the wiretap. Id. at 242. At the same time, the
court acceded to the government's request that it be allowed to intercept all communica-
tions taking place in Dalia's office, including those not involving the telephone.
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Consequently, at Dalia's trial the government was permitted to introduce
into evidence the numerous conversations that had been intercepted pursuant to
the surveillance order. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
petitioner's conviction and affirmed the district court's conclusion that no
explicit authorization of covert entry is necessary to carry out a surveillance
order.
9
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals. The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, held
that: the fourth amendment does not per se prohibit surreptitious entry made
for the purpose of placing or removing electronic surveillance equipment,1" Title
III gives courts the authority to approve the surreptitious entry of a suspect's
premises, and the fourth amendment does not mandate that a Title III electronic
surveillance order include express authorization to break and enter the
premises described in the order.
The Court first considered whether the fourth amendment proscribes all
covert entries of private premises. The majority found no basis for a
constitutional rule forbidding all covert entries. 1 In fact, the majority noted, it
is well established that law enforcement officials constitutionally may break
and enter private premises to execute a search warrant where such entry is the
only means to carry out the warrant. 2 Furthermore, Powell observed that the
Supreme Court had implied in several previous cases that covert entry into a
suspect's premises to install surveillance equipment pursuant to a search
warrant would be constitutionally permissible in some circumstances.1 3 Justice
Powell characterized as "frivolous" the argument that covert entries are
unconstitutional for their lack of notice, observing that the Court had stated
earlier that "officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an
otherwise [duly] authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence."
14
The majority then considered whether Congress, in passing Title III, had
given the courts the statutory power to approve covert entries. Petitioner Dalia
argued that Title III, which provides a comprehensive scheme for law officials'
use of surveillance, does not indicate that surreptitious entry is ever permissi-
ble. In rejecting this argument, the majority found that the language, structure,
and history of Title III indicate that Congress had not intended to limit the
9. United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
10. 441 U.S. at 248.
11. Id. at 247.
12. Id. (citing Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 933 (1975)).
13. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954), in which the Court
condemned state police officers who had installed bugging equipment in the defendant's
home by means of a covert entry "without a search warrant or other process."
14. 441 U.S. at 247-48 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967)).
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means by which court-authorized surveillance could be accomplished, provided
that the means are reasonable under the circumstances.' 5 Powell interpreted
congressional silence in Title III with respect to covert entry as a conscious
decision not to limit the means available to law enforcement officials, rather
than as an indication that Congress had failed to extend statutory authority to
covert entry. Moreover, the Court found that the legislative history of Title III
negates the assumption that Congress wished to except from the authorization
of Title III any electronic surveillance requiring covert entries. Rather, the
majority noted that testimony before subcommittees considering Title III
indicates that secret entries are an essential element of most electronic bugging
operations. 6 The majority concluded that Congress "clearly understood that it
was conferring power upon courts to authorize covert entries ancillary to their
responsibility to review and approve surveillance applications under the
statute.'
17
Assuming that Title III does in fact give statutory authority for covert
entries, the Court's final consideration was whether the electronic surveillance
order must explicitly approve such entries. The majority concluded that the
fourth amendment does not require an express statement of the means by which
the surveillance equipment may be placed or removed.'" This conclusion was
premised upon the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. Justice Powell
noted that the warrant clause contains three requirements: that a warrant be
issued by a neutral, detached magistrate; that officials seeking a warrant
demonstrate to the magistrate probable cause to believe that the evidence
sought will assist in apprehending or convicting a criminal; and that a warrant
describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Because the warrant in the instant case complied fully with these requirements,
the majority stated that no additional language was needed in the surveillance
order. The majority found nothing in the language of the Constitution itself nor
in past Court decisions interpreting that language to imply that search
warrants also must contain a specification of the precise manner in which they
should be executed. To the contrary, searching officers generally are given broad
discretion to determine the details of how to proceed with the search, subject to
the general fourth amendment constraint that searches and seizures be
reasonable.
Petitioner Dalia's final contention was that although the fourth amendment
ordinarily does not extend to the manner in which search warrants are carried
out, warrants for electronic surveillance are exceptional because they frequently
impinge upon two different fourth amendment interests. First, the surveillance
itself interferes with the right to hold private conversations. Additionally, a
covert entry into the premises followed by electronic surveillance subjects the
15. 441 U.S. at 249-54.
16. See note 192 infra.
17. 441 U.S. at 254.
18. Id. at 258-59.
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suspect's property to possible damage and his personal effects to unauthorized
examination. Justice Powell rejected this argument with the observation that
officers executing warrants often find it necessary to interfere with privacy
rights that the judge who issued the warrant had not considered. He noted,
moreover, that the warrant clause would be stretched "to the extreme" if the
Court were to command magistrates issuing warrants to detail precisely the
procedures that searching officers must follow whenever fourth amendment
rights might be affected in more than one way.19 The majority concluded that
they would merely be promoting "empty formalism" 20 if they required lower
courts to state explicitly what is implicit in bugging operations - that a covert
entry may be necessary in order to install the surveillance equipment.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the Constitution
requires that government officials who wish to place electronic listening devices
in a suspect's premises by means of a covert entry first must receive specific
authorization from the court issuing the surveillance order. Justice Brennan
stated that breaking and entering into private premises to plant a bug entails
an invasion of privacy of constitutional significance distinct from that accom-
panying non-trespassory surveillance. 21 He noted that there are three factors
unique to trespassory surveillance which mandate that covert entry be
described as an independent search and seizure which requires specific judicial
authorization. First, bugging may be accomplished without having to resort to
surreptitious entry and physical invasion of private property. Second, covert
entry breaches both conversational and physical privacy. Finally, because
possessions which are usually beyond the reach of simple eavesdropping are
accessible to the hands and eyes of government agents, the practice is especially
intrusive and prone to abuse.
Noting that the fourth amendment forbids an officer executing a search
warrant from exceeding the bounds set by the warrant, Justice Brennan
determined that a warrant describing only the seizure of conversations cannot
be read broadly to include authorization for a constitutionally separate invasion
of physical privacy by means of a covert entry at the discretion of the executing
officer. Indeed, the Constitution requires that the necessity of a physical
invasion be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate, not by the official
seeking evidence of a crime.
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the require-
ment of explicit court authorization would be tantamount to requiring
"'specification of the precise manner' in which surveillance orders are
executed. 22 He contended, rather, that a warrant constitutionally can leave the
details of the manner of conducting the entry to the discretion of the executing
officers, provided that the warrant explicitly states that the officers may use
surreptitious entry to accomplish the electronic surveillance.
19. Id. at 258.
20. Id.
21. Justice Brennan further characterized a covert entry as "tantamount to an
independent search and seizure." Id. at 260 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 261 (quoting the majority opinion, 441 U.S. at 257).
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Justice Brennan also chided the majority for stating that specific authoriza-
tion for covert entry would amount to "empty formalism." Rather, he observed
that requiring agents to secure authorization might prevent unnecessary and
improper entries and limit the surveillance to methods less drastic than home
invasion.
2 3
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens carefully examined the majority's
conclusion that Congress had given courts statutory authority in Title III to
permit federal agents to commit a criminal trespass. He questioned whether
such power should be read into a statute that did not expressly grant it, and
stated three reasons for refusing to do so. First, he noted that until Congress
spoke to the contrary, the Court's duty in protecting the rights of the individual
should have priority over the interest in more effective law enforcement.
Second, Title III itself precluded reading its silence on the issue of covert entry
as an unqualified approval. Finally, Justice Stevens concluded that the
legislative history of Title III proved that Congress had never intended that law
enforcement officials be given authority pursuant to Title III to break and enter
a surveillance target's home or office.
24
Justice Stevens found the majority's conclusions particularly curious in
light of the statute's otherwise exhaustive and explicit discussion of electronic
surveillance. 25 In his view, one could not assume that the same Congress that
had devised exacting procedural requirements to be met before a surveillance
order could be issued, would then leave the means of executing that order to the
sole discretion of the federal agents conducting the surveillance.
This same reasoning, Justice Stevens argued, also militated against the
Court's determination that the legislative history of Title III demonstrated
congressional intent to authorize the breaking and entering of private premises.
He observed that the meager and isolated remarks relied upon by the members
of the majority were insufficient evidence of congressional endorsement of covert
entry. Justice Stevens' paramount fear was that the Court's holding could be
interpreted as giving federal officers power to execute a surveillance order by
whatever means are necessary. He contended that the opposite conclusion is
true: congressional silence should not be interpreted to authorize the officer to
violate state criminal laws nor to violate constitutionally protected privacy
interests.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Framework
In the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States,26 the Supreme Court
considered for the first time whether the electronic interception of a suspect's
conversations by law enforcement officials is proscribed by the fourth amend-
23. Id.
24. Id. at 271 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 266-67.
26. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). See notes 47 & 48 and
accompanying text infra. The petitioners were convicted of a conspiracy to violate the
National Prohibition Act. Government agents obtained evidence of the conspiracy by
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ment. The Court held that the language of the fourth amendment 27 does not
apply to wiretapping when wires are tapped or conversations are intercepted
from outside the home.2' The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Taft,
relied on property concepts in stating that the words of the fourth amendment
should not be enlarged beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons,
papers, and effects, nor be employed so that search and seizure could be applied
to forbid hearing and sight.29 In effect, the decision established a two-prong
doctrine. First, only material items would be protected under the fourth
amendment. Second, a physical trespass was necessary before the interception of
conversation would be deemed to violate the fourth amendment.30
The Court extended the application of the Olmstead doctrine beyond
wiretaps to all cases of electronic surveillance in Goldman v. United States.3 1 In
Goldman, police officers had obtained permission from the building superinten-
dent to be in the room adjoining an office where incriminating conversations
would take place. The police officers then placed a detectaphone against the wall
to overhear the conversations. 32 The Supreme Court stated that evidence
obtained by bugging without physical trespass33 did not violate the fourth
amendment and was, therefore, admissible in federal courts.
34
secretly tapping telephones used by the conspirators. The tapping connections were made
in a large office building and on public streets.
27. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 465 (1928), overruled, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967). See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text infra.
29. 277 U.S. at 470. Justices Holmes and Brandeis authored dissents which are now
considered landmarks. Justice Holmes stated that he preferred "that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part" by ignoring the
fourth amendment. Id. Justice Brandeis found that the fourth amendment protects privacy
and thus applies to eavesdropping whether or not there is a physical invasion of the
premises. Id. at 478-79.
30. For a discussion of the Olmstead doctrine, see, Decker & Handler, Electronic
Surveillance: Standards, Restrictions and Remedies, 12 CAL. W.L. REV. 60, 62-66 (1975);
Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, Constitutional Development From Olmstead to
Katz, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 513, 515-16 (1968).
31. 316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). See notes 47 & 48 and
accompanying text infra.
32. 316 U.S. at 131-32.
33. The agents had committed a prior trespass to install listening apparatus, but the
device malfunctioned, and the agents then used the detectaphone. Id. at 131. The Court
concluded that the trespass was irrelevant to the evidence later obtained from the
intercepted conversations. Since there was no trespass related to the actual interceptions,
the Court expressly refused to distinguish Goldman from Olmstead on the basis of a
difference between eavesdropping and wiretapping. Id. at 134-35.
34. Id. at 135.
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The Goldman decision was upheld in On Lee v. United States35 in which the
Court found that the facts of the case did not show a violation of the fourth
amendment's search and seizure provisions.36 A conversation On Lee held in his
office with a police agent, who was carrying a microphone in. his coat pocket,
was overheard by a policeman on the street outside. 37 The Court concluded that
because the agent had entered the petitioner's place of business with consent,3"
no trespass had been committed; moreover, the Court found the presence of the
radio set insufficient to treat the case as a wiretapping. Although the petitioner
was overheard in conversation with the aid of a transmitter and receiver, the
effect on his privacy was the same as if the policeman had been eavesdropping
outside an open window. 39
In 1961 the Supreme Court, in Silverman v. United States,4" undermined
both prongs of the Olmstead doctrine. In Silverman, police officers pushed a
spike microphone through the party wall of an adjoining house. The spike made
contact with a heating duct in the petitioner's home, which allowed the
policemen listening next door to hear conversations taking place all over the
house.41 In contrast to the circumstances in the preceding cases, the eavesdrop-
ping in Silverman was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical
penetration into premises occupied by the petitioner. In both Goldman and On
Lee the Court had explicitly noted that eavesdropping had not been accom-
plished by means of unsanctioned physical invasion within a constitutionally
protected area. 42 Similarly, the absence of a physical encroachment had been an
essential factor in the Olmstead decision; the Court had observed that "the
insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the defendant. They
were made in the basement of a large office building. The taps from house lines
were made in the streets near the house. '43
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Silverman, noted that at the core
of the fourth amendment stands the right of an individual to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion into his own home." The Court further
stated that it "has never held that a federal officer may without warrant and
without consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there secretly
35. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
36. Id. at 750-53.
37. Id. at 749.
38. Id. at 751-52.
39. Id. at 753-54.
40. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
41. Id. at 506-07.
42. See note 33 and text accompanying note 38 supra.
43. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928), overruled, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967). See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text infra. The Court also noted that "It here
was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." 277 U.S. at 464. These facts led
the Court to find that "[tihe intervening wires are not part of Ithe defendant'sl house or
office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched." Id. at 465. (quoted
in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1961)).
44. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
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observe and listen, and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was
seen or heard."45
In holding that the fourth amendment may protect against the overhearing
of oral statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of material
objects, the Court swept away the first prong of the Olmstead doctrine. The
Court also disclaimed the Olmstead technicality of physical trespass. Rather,
the decision in Silverman was based "upon the reality of actual intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area."46 The Court noted that a physical trespass need
no longer accompany electronic surveillance as a prerequisite to fourth
amendment protection.
Several years later, in Katz v. United States,47 the Olmstead decision was
formally overruled.4" Katz was the third in a trilogy of cases decided by the
Court in the late 1960's which set forth the present standards for constitutional-
ly permissible electronic surveillance. The petitioner in Katz had been convicted
of interstate gambling offenses. The prosecution's case had been furthered
substantially by evidence obtained from an electronic eavesdropping device
attached to the exterior of a public phone booth used frequently by the
petitioner.49 At the outset of its decision the majority announced that it was
discarding the traditional analysis expressed in Olmstead, which had necessi-
tated a determination of whether police had invaded a "constitutionally
protected area."50 The Court noted that efforts to determine whether a given
"area" is "constitutionally protected" misdirects attention from the proper issue.
Indeed, the Court emphasized the fourth amendment protects people, not
places. 5 1 What one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. 52 The Court concluded that the fourth
amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible objects but extends to the
recording of oral statements overheard without any "'technical trespass ...
under local property law.' ,3
The Court then evaluated the actions of the law enforcement officials. The
surveillance had been so narrowly circumscribed,54 Justice Stewart noted, that
45. Id. at 512.
46. Id. In Olmstead the Court, by stressing an actual physical invasion, had implicitly
found that the fourth amendment protections extend to material items and certain defined
physical areas.
47. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. The Court stated that the fourth amendment protects people, not merely areas,
against unreasonable searches and seizures; thus, the reach of the amendment cannot
turn upon the absence or presence of a physical invasion. The Court concluded that the
trespass doctrine of Olmstead was no longer controlling. Id. at 353.
49. Id. at 348.
50. Id. at 350-51.
51. Id. at 351.
52. Id. at 351-52.
53. Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
54. The government agents did not begin their electronic surveillance until they had
established that the petitioner was using the telephone in furtherance of his criminal
activities. The surveillance itself was limited in both scope and duration to the particular
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if an authorized magistrate had been properly notified of the need for
surveillance, informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly told of
the precise intrusion the surveillance was to entail, he could have authorized
the limited search and seizure that had taken place. 55 A valid warrant, however,
had not been obtained. Therefore, the lack of antecedent judicial authorization
in the absence of exigent circumstances 56 was a constitutional defect so grave
that the search was unreasonable and violative of the petitioner's fourth
amendment rights.
5 7
The first case in the trilogy was Osborn v. United States."5 In Osborn, law
enforcement officials were informed that the petitioner, an attorney, sought to
bribe a juror.59 After securing judicial authorization to conduct electronic
surveillance, the law officers concealed a recording device on an undercover
informant prior to the informant's conversation with the petitioner.60 The Court
considered the permissibility of using such a device "under the most precise and
discriminate circumstances."6' The majority concluded that the use of the
recorder was permissible in light of the secrecy required and the questions that
had been raised regarding the integrity of the court. The "antecedent
justification before a magistrate" and the particularity surrounding the
surveillance procedures were the significant factors in the Court's decision that
the evidence obtained from the search and seizure by the concealed recorder was
constitutionally admissible.6
2
The second and most definitive opinion in the trilogy was Berger v. New
York. 63 In Berger the petitioner, who had been convicted of participating in a
conspiracy to bribe the chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority, had
been the subject of a lengthy electronic surveillance. The original eavesdropping
order permitted installation of a recording device in the petitioner's office for a
sixty-day period; a second order for the same duration was obtained from the
purpose of establishing the content of the petitioner's illegal telephone communications.
The agents conducted their surveillance only when the petitioner was using the phone
booth, and they listened only to his conversations. 389 U.S. at 354. The Court's approval of
"narrowly circumscribed" surveillance arises from the fact that the surveillance was a
limited intrusion within the standards for permissible searches established in Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See notes
61, 65 to 68, and accompanying text infra.
55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
56. See text accompanying note 226 infra.
57. 389 U.S. at 359.
58. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
59. Id. at 325-26.
60. Id. at 327.
61. Id. at 329. The Court contrasted this with the "'indiscriminate use of
[surveillance] devices in law enforcement'" which the Court had found would raise
"'grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments .... " Id. at
329 n.7 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring)).
62. 385 U.S. at 330-31.
63. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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court when the first one expired.64 Following a careful examination of the New
York electronic surveillance statute, the Court concluded that the statute was
too broad in its sweep. Because the statute allowed a court to authorize a
warrant under an extremely wide range of circumstances, 65 the Supreme Court
found that the statute violated the fourth amendment's command that warrants
particularly describe the place to be searched and the people and things to be
seized.
66
After stressing the general need for particularity, the Court described the
specific requirements of particularity that a surveillance order must possess in
order to be constitutionally valid.6 1 Without these requirements, the Court
observed, surveillance orders would lack adequate judicial supervision and
protective procedures and would result, therefore, in the issuance and licensing
of general searches by electronic devices.
68
Taken together, these three opinions stress the need for proper judicial
authorization and particularity so as to prevent illegitimate vesting of
unrestrained and excessive discretion in the hands of those law enforcement
officials who conduct the electronic surveillance. 69 Interceptions of oral evidence
must meet the same constitutional requirements imposed on traditional
searches and seizures of tangible evidence, which generally can be conducted
only pursuant to a warrant.7" This requirement was applied by the Court in
Katz.71 Berger took this requirement one step further by holding that the
64. Id. at 44-45.
65. Id. at 55-56.
66. Id. at 54-55.
67. The Court discussed the deficiencies in the New York statute, 388 U.S. at 55-58,
then reviewed and summarized them, id. at 58-60. The specificity requirements for a
valid surveillance order include:
(1) particularity in the description of the place to be searched and the persons or
objects to be seized;
(2) particularity in the description of the type of communication or conversation
sought;
(3) particularity in the description of the crime that has been, is being, or will be
committed;
(4) limitations on the officer executing the surveillance order to prevent him
from searching unauthorized areas or conducting further searches once the conversa-
tion sought has been seized;
(5) particularity in showing sufficient probable cause to justify an extension of
the surveillance order;
(6) a termination date for the order and a requirement that the officer executing
the surveillance make a return on the termination of the order showing what was
seized;
(7) a demonstration of exigent circumstances to justify allowing an unconsented
entry and to overcome the defect of not giving notice prior to the search and seizure.
68. The Court noted that the ultimate danger posed by electronic surveillance devices
easily could be compared to the danger in general warrants that was a catalyst to the
adoption of the fourth amendment. Id. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
69. See notes 273 to 278 and accompanying text infra.
70. See notes 251 to 254 and accompanying text infra.
71. See text accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
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particularity standards of search warrants apply to electronic surveillance
orders as well, and that intrusions must be minimized to the greatest extent
possible.72
B. Statutory Framework
1. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act
The first statute to provide for the regulation of wiretapping was passed in
1934.7" Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act proscribed the "intercep-
tion," "divulgence," and "use" of the contents of wire communications by
unauthorized persons.
74
Shortly after the passage of this act the Supreme Court interpreted these
words as prohibitions against wiretapping practices by federal agents. In
Nardone v. United States7 5 the Court established that the Federal Communica-
tions Act bars the use in federal courts of evidence obtained by federal agents by
wiretapping in violation of the statute.76 The decision was not founded upon
constitutional grounds, but upon the Court's supervisory powers over federal
courts and officers. The second Nardone case 77 extended this exclusionary ban to
include not only evidence obtained directly from wiretapping but also evidence
indirectly acquired from such surveillance..
Concurrently decided, however, were several cases in which the Court found
limited instances when evidence obtained from wiretapping could be admitted
at trial. In Lopez v. United States,78 for example, the Court held that consent to
police surveillance by one party to the conversation would assure admission at
trial of any evidence procured from surveillance.
79
Furthermore, despite the broad exclusionary principle that the Court had
attached to section 605, the method of surveillance was often outside the reach
of the statute, and thus the evidence arising from the surveillance was
72. See notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
73. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1976)).
74. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The blanket prohibitions of § 605 have
been modified by the authorization procedures of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. 88 2516-2517
(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
75. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
76. The Court found the plain mandate of the statute prevented government agents
from wiretapping even though explicit proscriptions of wiretapping had been introduced
previously in Congress and had not gained legislative approval. It has been suggested that
Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion, personally disapproved of wiretapping
and was influenced by this in his analysis. Note, Federal Decisions on the Constitutionality
of Electronic Surveillance Legislation, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 639, 648 n.35 (1973).
77. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 339 (1939).
78. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
79. For a discussion of the consent doctrine, see Greenwalt, The Consent Problem
in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With- the Consent of a
Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1968).
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admissible at trial.80 Until the late 1960's, unless there was an interception
covered by section 605 or an intrusion of the type condemned by the Court in
Silverman, there was no other constitutional or statutory provision preventing
the seizure of a third party's communications or the disclosure of their contents.
The Katz, Osborn, and Berger decisions, as previously described, and the
enactment of Title III by Congress significantly changed the laws of electronic
surveillance.
2. Title III
In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
8
'
in order to meet the constitutional requirements enunciated in the Supreme
Court's decisions in Berger and Katz. The Act prohibits all wiretapping and
electronic surveillance unless conducted by authorized local, state, and federal
law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or prevention of
enumerated serious crimes.8 2 Even then the surveillance is permissible only if a
80. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1961) (although much
of what officers heard with the aid of a spike microphone consisted of the petitioners' parts
in telephone conversations the officers did not intercept these conversations within the
meaning of § 605); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 131 (1954) (police who had overheard
conversations with the aid of a microphone hidden in the petitioner's house did not
interfere with a communications system or intercept any message in violation of the
statute); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (listening in the next room to
the petitioner's words as he talked into the telephone did not constitute an interception of
a wire communication). Although the Supreme Court has never held that Title III is
constitutional on its face, see United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 150 (1974); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972), it has upheld the
admission of evidence obtained under authority of Title III in the face of constitutional
challenge. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Donovan,
429 U.S. 413 (1977). Every court of appeals that has ruled on the issue has found Title III
constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 158-59 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975), 429 U.S. 837 (1976); United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837,
840 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524,
526 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975); United States v. O'Neill, 497 F.2d
1020, 1026 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Whitaker, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), rev'g 343
F. Supp. 358 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d
489, 495-500 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Cox, 462
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d
679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1972).
81. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
82. These restrictions demonstrate congressional intent to protect individual privacy.
That concern is also seen in one of the findings that Congress inserted in the statute prior
to the text:
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral
communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented to the
interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent
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detailed procedure is followed.8 3 Title III of the Act was passed for the primary
purpose of combating organized crime8 4 by "allowing police to conduct
constitutionally inoffensive, yet effective, electronic surveillance,"8 5 while
"protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and. . . delineating
on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the
interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized.' '86 The
Supreme Court has referred to Title III as a "comprehensive scheme for the
regulation of wiretapping and electronic surveillance."
8 7
Congress styled certain provisions of the Act to parallel the Supreme
Court's analysis in Berger, in an effort to overcome the constitutional defects
that the Court had pinpointed in the New York electronic surveillance statute.
Title III requires officers who seek judicial authorization for surveillance to
provide a statement of the facts relied upon to justify the belief that an offense is
being committed. This statement must include a description of the nature and
locations of the facilities from which or the place where the communications will
be intercepted, a description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and the identity of the person whose communications are to be
intercepted. 8 The application for a surveillance order must also include the
investigative reasons for the need of electronic surveillance, with a statement of
whether other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
appear unlikely to be successful.89 Finally, it must also provide a statement of
the time period for which the interception will be maintained.9 °
On the basis of these facts the judge may enter an order authorizing
interception of wire or oral communications. However, the judge first must
determine that there is probable cause to believe that an individual is
jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing
court.
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 211 (1968).
83. The only exceptions to these prohibitions and requirements apply to the power of
the President of the United States to obtain information to protect the country from
threats to its internal security and from external attack, to Federal Communications
Commission employees in the discharge of the Commission's monitoring responsibilities,
and to employees of a communications common carrier while engaged in an activity
necessary to providing service or in protection of the rights or property of the carrier. S.
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2153-54.
84. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2153.
85. Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 1977).
86. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2153.
87. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976).
89. Id. The legislative history of Title III indicates that this requirement is to be read
in a "practical and commonsense fashion." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2190.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976).
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committing or has committed one of the enumerated offenses,9 1 that particular
communications concerning that offense will be obtained through the intercep-
tion, that normal investigative procedures have failed or appear unlikely to be
successful, and that the place where or facilities from which the communications
will be intercepted are commonly used by the individual under surveillance or
are used in connection with the commission of the crime.
92
If an interception order is issued, the statute requires that it specify the
identity of the agency that authorized the interception, the person whose
conversations will be intercepted, the nature and location of the place where the
interception will occur, a description of the type of communication to be
intercepted, and, finally, the duration of the authorization. 93 The statute also
requires that the interception be maintained for only a limited period of time,94
that the order be exercised promptly,95 and that the agents make a timely
return on the order showing what has been seized. 96 Finally, the statute
provides that within a reasonable time after the interception is terminated, the
persons named in the interception order must be served with an inventory
which gives notice of the order or application, and indicates whether com-
munications were intercepted.
97
Although Title III carefully delineates the procedures that both the law
officers and the authorizing magistrate must follow for a valid surveillance
order to be issued, it is curiously silent regarding the means by which the law
officers may execute the surveillance order. It is this silence which has been the
source of much controversy in the past few years as courts have grappled with
the question whether law enforcement officials, who have followed the
procedures mandated by Title III and procured an order for electronic
surveillance, may covertly break and enter the premises of the individual who is
the target of the surveillance to install, repair, or remove the eavesdrop devices.
91. These offenses are enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). A
similar provision in § 2516(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) lists the offenses that enable a state
officer to seek a surveillance order from a state court.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976). These probable cause requirements were added to
meet the Supreme Court's finding in Berger that the New York surveillance statute's
"reasonable cause" standard was too lax. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-55
(1967).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1976). The provisions regarding specification of the place
from which the interception is taking place and the type of communication sought to be
intercepted were added in response to the Supreme Court's exceptions in Berger that the
New York statute did not require that the place to be searched and the items to be seized
be described with particularity. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56-59 (1967).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
95. Id. § 2518(8).
96. Id. The Court had criticized the New York statute for its lack of limitations on
period of execution and its failure to require the officers to make a return showing the
products of the surveillance. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976). The New York statute analyzed in Berger had
contained no provision for notice. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). For a
discussion of the notice provision of Title III, see, United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413,
428-32 (1977).
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III. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR COVERT ENTRY
A. Implicit Authority Under Title III
The Supreme Court in Dalia looked to both the language and the legislative
history of Title III in an effort to determine whether authority for covert
breaking and entering is implicit in the statute. The legislative history of Title
III does not deal directly with the problem of entry collateral to electronic
surveillance. Nevertheless, it is apparent that members of Congress were aware
of the entry problem from their references to it in hearings and debates on the
interception of oral communications. Senator Morse, an opponent of Title III,
and Senator Tydings, one of the Act's supporters, stated during Senate debates
on the statute's provisions that break-ins might be necessary in order to install
eavesdropping devices.9" If, however, Congress did intend to allow such conduct
under a surveillance order, the members did not find it necessary to write their
intent into the statute. There is no mention of authorization of breaking and
entering in the Committee reports, and neither house of Congress publicly
considered, confronted, or debated that issue.
Nevertheless, some district and circuit courts and some commentators have
construed congressional silence in Title III on the issue of covert entry as
implicit authority to break and enter.99 After the passage of Title III the
majority of early court decisions adhered to this view. Only those lower court
decisions most immediately preceding Dalia rejected this view and argued
adamantly that whatever power had not been bestowed explicitly by the statute
could not be inferred legitimately.1 ° ° The Supreme Court, like other courts
which have concluded that implicit authority to break and enter can be found in
Title III, relied upon oblique references in the statute and its legislative history.
If Congress had not intended to sanction surreptitious entry as a means of
executing surveillance orders, the Court asserted, it would have specifically
prohibited such activity in the statute.
98. 114 CONG. REC. 11598, 12989 (1968). See text accompanying notes 127 & 128
infra.
99. See, e.g., Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See
McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Surveillance: How
Do You Proceed After the Court Says "Yes"?, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1977).
Some courts have failed to address the issue at all, but implicitly assumed that
the power to break and enter existed, and went directly to the issue of whether the court
granting the surveillance order must explicitly authorize surreptitious entry into private
premises to install the bugging device. See, e.g., United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d
Cir. 1978), aff'd, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); United States v. Rowland, 448 F. Supp. 22 (N.D.
Tex. 1977); United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 930 (1978).
100. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929
(1979); United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), va6ated, 441 U.S. 939, rev'd,
600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
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1. Statutory Language
The Dalia majority, as well as other courts and commentators who have
concluded that Congress has implicitly given magistrates the power to sanction
surreptitious entries, have found a number of indications in the language of
certain provisions of Title III to support their conclusion. One such provision is
section 2518 (1), which discusses surveillance in terms of the interception of
both "wire" and "oral" communications. 0 1 Interception of oral communication
frequently entails the placement of a bug. In addition, Congress defined
"electronic, mechanical, or other device"'10 2 broadly to mean "any device or
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication,"10' thus
including in the definition those listening devices which frequently require
covert installation. 0 4 Congress also required that both the application for and
the court order granting authority to conduct electronic surveillance describe
with particularity the "nature and location of the facilities from which or the
place where the communication is to be intercepted. °1 0 5 This requirement was
included specifically to comply with the constitutional command of particularity
that the Supreme Court had enunciated in both Berger and Katz.'0 6
The Dalia majority found that these provisions reflect congressional
understanding that law enforcement officials would have to place listening
devices inside buildings and thus would have to enter those buildings
surreptitiously.'0 7 "Nowhere in Title III," wrote Justice Powell, "is there any
indication that the authority of courts under § 2518 is to be limited to approving
those methods . . . that do not require covert entry for installation of
intercepting equipment.
'
"
1 0 8
The Court then cited the 1970 amendment to section 2518(4) as a final
indication of congressional intent to authorize covert entry. That section now
provides in relevant part that:
[a]n order authorizing the interception .. .shall, upon the request of the
applicant, direct that a communication common carrier, landlord, or other
person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and
technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively
109
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a) (1976). The first bill introduced in Congress following the
Berger and Katz decisions on electronic surveillance had covered only wiretapping. See
text accompanying note 142 infra.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b) (1976).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
104. It is possible, however, to conduct electronic surveillance without entering the
target's private premises surreptitiously. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (1976) (emphasis added). See also id. §2518(4)(b).
106. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2112, 2190.
107. 441 U.S. at 249-50.
108. Id. at 250.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1976).
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Similarly, the Fourth Circuit noted in Application of the United States that
this provision, "at least inferentially, supports the . . . position that Congress
intended to approve covert entry as a permissible concomitant of judicially-
sanctioned eavesdropping ... "110 The district court in United States v. Ford"'
agreed with this interpretation. Although recognizing that the amendment
could suggest a lack of authority to break and enter, the court nevertheless
found that it was apparent from the amendment that Congress was aware that
some bugging devices require surreptitious entry for installation. The Ford
court observed further that Congress expressly had granted to courts the power
to order landlords and custodians to assist law enforcement officials so that such
installations could be made unobtrusively.' 1 2 Since the statute did not prohibit
the use of such devices by police or federal agents, Congress must have at least
implicitly recognized that courts have a general power" 3 to authorize, in some
circumstances, a covert, and possibly otherwise illegal, entry to install,
maintain, or remove a bugging mechanism.
1 14
Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan found these arguments unconvinc-
ing and refused to confer such broad power upon courts without more explicit
authority to do so from Congress. They argued that if authority for covert entry
has not been given explicitly by Congress, it legitimately cannot be inferred.
The majority of Title III's provisions are efforts to circumscribe narrowly the use
of electronic surveillance in order to safeguard privacy. Furthermore, Congress
drafted the statute with "exacting precision . . . 'requir[ing] close attention to
the dotting of every "i" and the crossing of every "t". . . .' Under these
circumstances the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to
determining Congress' intent, and we would do well to confine ourselves to that
area."
115
In light of these restrictions and the care with which the statute was drawn,
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Dalia, found that it was "unrealistic" to assume
that Congress, without making its intention "unmistakably plain," had
110. Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 1977). Accord,
United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978);
United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir.
1977); United States v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. 931, 932-34 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d
1372 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 930 (1979).
111. 414 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The
surveillance in Ford was undertaken pursuant to authority given by provisions of the
District of Columbia Code relating to electronic surveillance. These provisions are
contained in 23 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 541-556 (1973 & Supp. IV 1977) and are based on the
corresponding sections in Title III. See 115 CONG. REC. 19268 (1969) (summary by Sen.
Hruska). In light of the similarity of the statutes and their common origin, the court relied
on the history of Title III and cases interpreting the statutes where relevant.
112. 414 F. Supp. at 883.
113. But see text accompanying notes 208 to 219 infra.
114. 414 F. Supp. at 883.
115. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 441 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
part) (citations omitted) (quoting Sen. McClellan's remarks at 114 CONG. REC. 14751
(1968)).
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authorized federal agents implementing a surveillance order to break into
private premises in violation of state law. He criticized the majority's finding of
open-ended authorization to make such illegal entries in the absence of any
express judicial authorization to do so. He echoed the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit that it did not make sense to infer congressional sanction of break-ins
when "not a single word or line of the statute"" 6 so much as mentions such a
possibility, "much less limits or defines the scope of this power or describes the
circumstances under which such conduct, normally unlawful, may take
place."i
7
Furthermore, Justice Stevens contended, any reliance upon the 1970
amendments to Title III is misplaced. Since Congress had been careful to amend
Title III to provide for "unobtrusive" entry through the assistance of custodians
and landlords who already had some access to the target property, it would not
have condoned unrestrained and unauthorized breaking and entering by law
enforcement agents.
Similarly, in United States v. Santora,"s the Ninth Circuit did not find
authorization for covert entry by law enforcement officers in either the language
of Title III itself or the 1970 amendments to Title III. The Santora court directly
attacked the argument that implicit authority for break-ins could be found in
section 2518(i)(b)(ii) of the statute. The court pointed out that the "place where
the communication is to be intercepted" could mean only a telephone booth,
some other public place, or the outside of a house or office building. 1 9 The
language does not, the court emphasized, compel an interpretation that the law
enforcement officer seeking the court order may place the eavesdropping device
within a private building.
The Santora court also found the 1970 amendments to Title III inapplicable
as a source of authority for covert entry.120 The court observed that the purposes
of the amendments were twofold. First, the amendments were designed merely
to express congressional intent that the general ban on electronic surveillance
would not render unlawful the cooperation of landlords and custodians with law
enforcement officials in the interception of communications. Further, the
amendments permitted a surveillance order to direct such people to assist the
officers so that the interception could be accomplished unobtrusively and with
as little interference as possible with the usual services that the landlords and
custodians provide for the surveillance target.' 2 1 Second, the 1970 amendments
116. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929
(1979).
117. Id.
118. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 939,
rev'd, 600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
119. Id. at 461.
120. Id. at 464 n.10. In addition to the amendment of § 2518(4), two other sections of
Title III were amended in 1970, §§ 2511(2)(a)(ii) and 2520.
121. See Senator McClellan's explanation of the amendment, 115 CONG. REC. 37192
(1969).
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also included a provision that good faith reliance on a court order or legislative
sanction was a "complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under
this chapter or under any other law."122 As the legislative history indicates, the
Santora court stated, the purpose of this amendment was not to insulate from
liability those who participated in a covert break-in. Rather, this amendment
was to protect telephone companies and other agencies cooperating with the
government from liability for assisting in the tapping of their customers'
telephones.
123
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Finazzo,124 considered what the
consequences would be if Title III were interpreted as the source of authority for
covert breaking and entering. A federal statute, the court noted, is also an
enabling act for state and local judges. 12 Therefore, once the state has passed a
statute "authorizing interception of wire and oral communications," 126 the
statute permits eavesdropping by local police under the same standards as apply
to federal agents. If Title III is interpreted to authorize federal agents covertly
to break and enter a suspect's private premises, the statute also would require
the courts to vest such power in the hands of the state and local police as well.
The Finazzo court stated that "Orwell's image of 1984 is no longer fiction if we
should hold that hundreds of police officers . ..have the power to break into
homes and offices to plant electronic monitoring devices if they can obtain
permission from a local magistrate in a secret hearing. ' 27 The sentiments are
expressed more dramatically, perhaps, than is necessary. The statement does
illustrate, however, the dangers that would accompany granting agents the
power to enter private premises surreptitiously, especially if the power is not
tempered by a requirement that it exist only when expressly authorized by a
court in the surveillance order.
1 28
2. Legislative History
The Dalia majority relied on the legislative history of Title III to support
their conclusion that Title III was meant to authorize covert entry of a suspect's
private premises. In many ways, however, the legislative history of Title III is
as unenlightening as is the language of the statute itself.
The statements cited by the Dalia majority, as well as other courts, as
evidence of authorization for covert entry are of questionable value. For
example, the following excerpt from the Title III debates has been deemed to
imply congressional authorization of surreptitious entry. Senator Morse, an
opponent of Title III, argued:
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
123. 115 CONG. REC. 37192 (1969) (explanation by Sen. McClellan).
124. 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929 (1979).
125. Id. at 842.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(b) (1976).
127. 583 F.2d at 841.
128. See text accompanying notes 261 to 332 infra.
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I know that elaborate efforts are made to distinguish between a real
wiretap, or bug, which requires someone to intrude upon private premises
to install. That kind of invasion is truly a search, requiring a warrant under
conditions set forth in article 4. But electronic surveillance, whereby
conversations can be picked up from scores of feet away, without any
physical intrusion upon the premises involved, is a far more invidious
invasion of privacy, and one which I do not believe should be tolerated at
all.129
Senator Tydings, a proponent of the bill, responded, contending that traditional
investigative techniques would not be dispensed completely with in favor of
electronic surveillance because "[electronic] surveillance is very difficult to use.
Tape [sic] must be installed on the telephones, and wires strung. Bugs are
difficult to install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible.
Often, more than one entry is necessary to adjust equipment., 130
The argument that these statements authorize covert entries is unconvinc-
ing. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the comments must be read in
context.131 Senator Tydings' emphasis on the technological limitations of "taps"
and "bugs" were intended to show that frequent use, and therefore, abuse of
electronic surveillance would be difficult.1 32 Justice Stevens interpreted Senator
Tydings' remark as nothing more than an expression that authorized electronic
surveillance would be sparingly used and carefully controlled and circums-
cribed.
The Ninth Circuit in Santora also found fault with arguments that the
comments of Senators Tydings and Morse were indicative of implicit authority
by Congress to allow covert breaking and entering. Rejecting the argument that
Senator Morse's comment indicated a congressional belief that break-ins are
essential, the court fittingly interpreted the statement as an indication of the
Senator's objections to electronic surveillance, his contentions that a search
129. 114 CONG. REC. 11598 (1968).
130. Id. at 12989.
131. A more complete version of the text of Senator Tydings' comments is as follows:
Contrary to what we have heard, electronic surveillance is not a lazy way to
conduct an investigation. It will not be used wholesale as a substitute for physical
investigation.
The reasonts] for such sparing use are simple. First, electronic surveillance is
really useful only in conspiratorial activities ....
Second, surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape [sic] must be installed on
telephones, and wires strung. Bugs are difficult to install in many places since
surreptitious entry is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is necessary to
adjust equipment ...
Third, monitoring this equipment requires the expenditure of a great amount of
law enforcement's time. ...
114 CONG. REC. 12988-89 (1968).
132. Surreptitious entry often is possible only by violating the law, but it is "hardly
'difficult'" if it may be effected by whatever means the law enforcement officials can
utilize without being constrained by the provisions of criminal law. Dalia v. United States,
441 U.S. 238, 273 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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warrant must be issued before there can be physical intrusion upon private
premises, and his understanding that the bill before Congress would authorize
only non-trespassory surveillance.
133
In addition, the court determined that when Senator Tydings' comments
were read in context it was apparent that he had not intended "surreptitious
entry" to be synonymous with burglary or breaking and entering. Instead, the
Senator had been indicating reasons why there had been so few bugs and
wiretaps authorized under the New York statute, which later had been
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Berger.134 Rather than arguing in favor of
authorization of trespasses and break-ins, Senator Tydings had been arguing
that Title III would minimize invasions of privacy because it included numerous
safeguards of privacy rights and because legitimate entries were difficult.135
Other statements that refer less directly to the problem of covert entry also
have been used to buttress the conclusion that Congress did intend to authorize
covert break-ins. The district court in United States v. Ford, for example, noted
one such comment: "'A wiretap can take up to several days to install. Other
forms or devices may take even longer'."'136 The Ford court found that this
statement, when read in conjunction with the 1970 amendment to section
2518(4) and Congress' failure to place any limits or restrictions upon the
manner of executing the surveillance order, established congressional intent to
allow covert entry.
137
As the Santora court pointed out, however, any reliance placed upon this
excerpt is misplaced; if any inference concerning trespass could appropriately be
drawn from the passage, it is only that Congress recognized the difficulty of
gaining consensual entry to those premises the government seeks to bug. The
difficulty in conducting surveillance by means of a bug, the court noted, is not in
the mechanics of installation but in gaining entry by legal means.138
Another statement that has been relied upon as an indication of implicit
authorization of covert entry is a comment made by a member of the Senate
Judiciary Committee that special protection must be given to private
conversations. 39 One commentator suggested that this statement presumes
133. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
939, rev'd, 600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
134. Id. at 461. See 114 CONG. REC. 12988-89 (1968).
135. During debate on Title III Senator McClellan had told the Senate, "The proposal
.•. is more strict, there are more requirements, and it is more difficult to meet the test to
get the order than it was in New York." 114 CONG. REC. 11231 (1968).
136. United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 146
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103, reprinted in 119681
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2192).
137. 414 F. Supp. at 883.
138. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
939, rev'd,600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
139. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess. 89-90, reprinted in 119681 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2177-78.
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surreptitious entry into and surveillance of a home or office.14° An equally
compelling argument, however, is that the statement, similar to others
incorporated in the legislative history of Title III, demonstrates nothing more
than congressional concern that safeguards be placed upon electronic surveil-
lance methods to ensure compliance with the requirements of the fourth
amendment. 141
The Supreme Court's decisions in Berger and Katz also have been cited as
sources of permission for covert entry into private premises. Early in 1967,
Senator McClellan introduced Senate bill 675, the forerunner of Title 111.142
When the bill was introduced, neither the Berger nor the Katz decision had been
announced by the Supreme Court. Thus, wiretapping was prohibited by the
Federal Communications Act of 1934,143 but bugging was legal so long as it was
not accomplished by an unauthorized physical intrusion.1 44 The original bill,
therefore, left undisturbed the pre-Berger law that permitted only a non-
trespassory bugging.
The Supreme Court decided Berger shortly after the introduction of Senate
bill 675. In response to this decision and in an attempt to meet the
constitutional requirements the Court had imposed, a new bill, Senate bill
2050,' was introduced by Senator Hruska.146 Although this bill allowed law
enforcement officials to conduct surveillance by eavesdropping, it, like its
eventual successor, contained no provision authorizing break-ins or trespasses
to install, maintain, or remove the bugging devices. Senate bill 2050 expanded
the scope of Senate bill 675 by extending strict controls on the authorization and
use of eavesdropping by law enforcement agents, and by banning private use of
bugging devices altogether. 47 It is apparent from Senator Hruska's comments
that his bill was intended to comply with all the Supreme Court decisions on the
140. McNamara, supra note 99, at 8. McNamara found the validity of this presumption
supported by the fact that two years after Title III was enacted Congress passed a nearly
identical statute for the District of Columbia. The D.C. statute also contains no provisions
governing surreptitious entry but does contain specific references to homes and offices and
provides particular requirements for wiretapping and bugging in these situations. 23 D.C.
CODE ANN. § 547(a) (1973 & Supp. IV 1977). McNamara stated that if a requirement for
entry was necessary, it was reasonable to assume that it would have been included.
McNamara, supra note 99, at 8-9.
141. See notes 92, 93, 96 & 97 and accompanying text supra.
142. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2112, 2274.
143. See text accompanying notes 74 to 76 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 40 to 46 supra. There was no federal statute
prohibiting bugging.
145. Also known as the Electronic Surveillance Act of 1967.
146. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, reprinted in 119681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2274.
147. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 958 (1967).
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issue of electronic surveillance, including the then recently announced Berger
and Katz decisions.
1 48
As it was finally enacted, Title III contained a number of provisions that
were included in an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court decisions in
Berger and Katz.149 It has been argued that these and other Supreme Court
decisions implicitly permit trespasses for placing eavesdropping devices if the
surveillance has been sanctioned by a court order.' 50 Berger and Katz, however,
proscribed unwarranted eavesdropping even when conducted by non-trespassory
methods. As has been discussed herein, these decisions extended the fourth
amendment's protections to include not only the seizure of tangibles but also the
seizure of communications, whether or not the seizure was made possible by a
breaking and entering.'
5
'
Neither of these cases overruled the Silverman doctrine, which prohibited
electronic surveillance accompanied by an unauthorized physical intrusion. This
was noted by the Court a year after the Katz decision:
Nor do we believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw
any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the hoiae or to
overrule the existing doctrine, recognized at least since Silverman, that
conversations as well as property are excludable from the criminal trial
when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the home152
Some courts seemingly have interpreted Berger as implicitly overruling
Silverman, finding significant the fact that in Berger surveillance had been
conducted by means of eavesdropping equipment installed in the petitioner's
office following a covert break-in by agents. 5 3 These authorities have found
that since the Supreme Court did not order the suppression of the evidence
obtained pursuant to the break-in, but decided the case on other grounds, the
decision suggests the constitutional permissibility of trespassory entry to place
eavesdropping devices. Support for this conclusion, it has been argued, can be
derived from the Court's awareness of the nature of the entry in Berger. The
majority spoke of a "trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area;"'154 the concurring and dissenting justices noted the manner of entry;155
148. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, reprinted in 119681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 2112, 2274.
149. Members of Congress carefully considered these two cases. Analyses of these
opinions are part of the congressional record, 114 CONG. REC. 12986-88 (1968), and the
entire text of Katz was read into the record, id. at 14725-28.
150. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1978). vacated, 441 U.S. 939,
rev'd, 600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
151. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
152. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969).
153. Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977). See
McNamara, supra note 99, at 5-7.
154. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967).
155. Id. at 64-65, 67 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("surreptitious methods" were utilized);
id. at 70, 81 (Black, J., dissenting).
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and the Court could have assumed a covert break-in occurred, because the
installation of listening devices by such means was not a novel police
procedure. 15 6 In light of this awareness, and the fact that Congress did not
require that a valid surveillance statute contain a section narrowly circumscrib-
ing the time, manner, and method of entry necessary to be constitutional or
that a judicially-authorized surveillance order contain such limitations, it is
arguable that the court in Berger did not find such provisions necessary to
authorize a surveillance order.
These arguments, however, overlook several important points. First,
because the Berger majority found that the New York surveillance statute was
unconstitutional on its face, 5 ' the Court never had to reach the issue of
permissible means of implanting a surveillance device. The Court's holding was
sufficient to make inadmissible at trial evidence obtained from the eavesdrop-
ping.
Second, the Court's awareness of the manner of entry employed by the
police and of the usefulness of obtaining evidence of crimes in this fashion does
not necessarily imply constitutionality or the Court's approval. A study of case
law, in fact, demonstrates that the contrary is true. In Irvine v. California,5 ' for
example, police officers sent a locksmith to the home of the petitioner to make a
door key. They later entered the home on several occasions to install and
reposition a concealed microphone. Members of the Court, offended by this
conduct, stated:
That officers of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a
device, even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation of the occupants
for over a month would be almost incredible if it were not admitted. Few
police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliber-
ately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the
Fourth Amendment.
159
Although it is true, as the Dalia Court noted, that four justices of the Irvine
Court alluded to the policemen's failure to obtain a warrant for the entry, it is
also true that no justice sanctioned the entry in the absence of a court order
expressly granting authority for physical entry of the target premises. The case
cannot be interpreted as condoning an unauthorized official trespass. Furth-
156. McNamara, supra note 99, at 7 (footnote omitted).
157. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44, 64 (1967). This was emphasized in United
States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 528-30 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975).
158. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
159. Id. at 132. The Court, however, affirmed the lower court which had allowed the
testimony by officers of conversations they had heard through the listening installations.
The Court found that the holding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) was controlling. In Wolf the Court had first established the principle
that the concept of due process found in the fourteenth amendment embodied the "security
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrustion by the police." Id. at 27. The Court, however,
had then held that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime the admission of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure was not forbidden by the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 33.
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ermore, Congress' mention of the case during the Title III debates, without
explanation or interpretation, cannot in good conscience be relied upon as
support of the police behavior that the Irvine Court had condemned.
As Justice Stevens noted, congressional references during the Title III
debates to the various types of surveillance that the Court had reviewed in prior
cases should not be construed as authorization of all of those methods. Not only
Irvine, but other Supreme Court cases as well, condemned the conduct of the law
enforcement officials involved. Far from advocating all of those surveillance
techniques, Congress was making an effort to avoid the unconstitutional aspects
of those cases.
Furthermore, the fact that a surveillance order can be valid even though it
lacks time, manner, and method of entry provisions might indicate that
installation by means of a trespass is absolutely forbidden. If a covert,
trespassory entry is not one of the options considered when determining the best
means of effectuating the surveillance order, then time, manner, and method of
surveillance provisions would be unnecessary.
For the Dalia majority, as well as for those lower federal courts that ruled
in favor of implicit authorization for covert entry in Title III, the final argument
was that Congress sought to arm federal investigators with the power to
eavesdrop. That intention would preclude prohibiting surreptitious installation
of devices, which might be necessary to exercise that power effectively.1"'
Indeed, it is argued, because section 2518 of Title III does not explicitly limit the
manner of placement of electronic surveillance equipment, surreptitious entry is
a statutorily viable technique. To hold otherwise, these courts have contended,
would run counter to the principles that courts are obligated to "attempt to
effectuate the purpose of federal legislation and to avoid interpretations which
produce absurd or nugatory results."'161 The most logical assumption to be made
from congressional silence is that the normal methods of effectuating electronic
surveillance were already authorized and would continue. As one judge
recognized:
Our courts regularly authorize and approve wire tapping, eavesdropping,
and surreptitious entries. . . .[C]ourt orders .. .authorize government
agents to "Intercept wire communications. . .[and to] install and maintain
an electronic eavesdropping device within the [room of building at a specific
address] to intercept [certain specified] oral communications .. .concern-
ing [certain] described offenses. Installations .. .may be accomplished by
any reasonable means, including, surreptitious entry or entry by ruse.
,,162
These arguments cannot be definitively countered, just as the assertions of
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Dalia, and those circuits that agree with his
160. See, e.g., Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977).
161. Id. at 642.
162. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 241-42 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975).
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interpretations cannot be proven incorrect. It is at least equally logical to
conclude that if Congress had intended to authorize breaking and entering to
effectuate a surveillance order, it would have explicitly so stated. This
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in 1978, when Congress chose to
authorize trespassory eavesdropping in national security cases, it required that
both application and intercept orders state explicity that "physical entry is
required to effect the surveillance."' 163 In view of this explicit recognition and
the careful delineation of the powers and duties of both courts and government
agents in other aspects of surveillance, it appears unwarranted to infer the same
recognition in Title III without an express statement by Congress.
It is impossible to determine positively whether Congress intended Title III
implicitly to authorize courts to grant law enforcement officials permission to
break and enter when conducting electronic surveillance. An examination of the
lower federal court cases during the period of 1976 to 1979 discloses a trend
toward either of two conclusions. Some courts held that surreptitious entry was
not permissible under any circumstances.16 4 Others held that surreptitious
entry could be justified only in carefully circumscribed situations. 165 The
Supreme Court's opinion in Dalia was a sharp departure from this trend. In its
consideration of surreptitious entry, the Court seems to have disregarded
implications of earlier Court decisions as well as important points raised by the
lower courts.
Because a majority of the Supreme Court found sufficient authority in Title
III and its legislative history for breaking and entering, the Court did not have
to consider other possible sources of authority. Given the rather questionable
basis for the Court's conclusion that Title III implicitly authorizes covert entry,
however, an examination of the other potential sources of authority seems
warranted.
B. Other Possible Statutory Sources of Authority
1. 18 U.S.C. Section 3109
At least one court 6 6 has found that 18 U.S.C. section 3109 can be applied to
provide authority for the execution of a surveillance order by means of
surreptitious entry. This law, the only federal statute on the subject of forcible
entry, forbids forcible entry into a home to execute a search warrant unless an
officer who has given notice of both his authority and purpose is refused
163. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, §§ 104(a)(8), 105(b)(1)(D), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(8), 1805(b)(1)(D) (Supp. 11 1978).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
929 (1979); United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 939,
rev'd. 600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
165. See, e.g., Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
166. See United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. 1045
(1977).
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admittance or is in need of liberation. 6 v The statute is a codification of common
law and is subject to any exceptions recognized at common law. 168
On its face section 3109 appears to convey no authority to agents to break
and enter private premises in the execution of an intercept order. Indeed, the
statute specifically applies to homes but makes no mention of commercial
premises. This reflects the common law tradition that afforded greater
protection from unannounced, forcible entry to homes than to non-dwellings. 169
Some courts have nevertheless extended the applicability of the statute, in
limited circumstances, to include commercial premises. One such case was
United States v. Phillips,170 in which the Ninth Circuit found that a locked
commercial establishment, occupied by the defendant at night, was a "house" as
that word is used in section 3109.171 In addition, because section 3109 requires
police to give notice before they forcibly enter a building, covert breaking and
entering in the execution of a surveillance is apparently not within the purview
of this statute.'72 Both the Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that in
the context of electronic surveillance police need not announce their presence
and purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search. 173 To require an
announcement would obviously defeat the purpose of the surveillance.
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part
of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself
or a person aiding him in the execution of a warrant.
Although originally enacted to govern the execution of search warrants, the
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the statute to include covert entries made to
effectuate an arrest, with or without a warrant. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585,
588 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958). Several courts have found, at
least implicitly, that surveillance orders and search warrants are equivalent. See, e.g.,
United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 845 (6th Cir. 1978) ("eavesdropping warrant"),
vacated, 441 U.S. 929 (1979); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected this position in United
States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 462 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 939, rev'd, 600
F.2d 1317 (1979). This Comment will presume that the two court orders are equivalent.
168. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 588-90 (1968).
169. See Comment, The Permissibility of Forcible Entries By Police In Electronic
Surveillance, 57 B.U.L. REV. 587, 595-99 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Permissibility of
Forced Entries].
170. 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974).
171. Id. at 1133. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-84 (1963)
(Defendant was arrested at his place of business which was linked by a hallway to his
home. The Court held that because the government had not cited exigent circumstances
justifying noncompliance with § 3109 the arrest was invalid.); United States v. Case, 435
F.2d 766, 770 n.1 (7th Cir. 1970) (Section 3109 has been held to include commercial
premises, just as has the fourth amendment.).
172. Opening a closed but unlocked door or using a passkey is an "unannounced
intrustion" as that term is used in § 3109. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590
(1968).
173. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 351, 355 n.16 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 60 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 328-30 (1966). 114 CONG. REC.
13208 (1968).
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In Agrusa v. United States,174 the Eighth Circuit, however, apparently
extended section 3109 to include forcible entry by agents to install an electronic
surveillance device. The Agrusa court noted that there are exceptions to section
3109, and implied that covert entry to install surveillance equipment might be
one such exception to the notice requirement of section 3109.175 The court
concluded that the statute "is not ... to be woodenly applied without regard to
the particular circumstances at hand ... .,176 In reaching this conclusion the
court relied upon language in Sabbath v. United States:1 77
Exceptions to any possible constitutional rule relating to announcement
and entry have been recognized, see Ker v. California, [374 U.S.] at 47,
(opinion of Brennan, J.) and there is little reason why those limited
exceptions might not also apply to § 3109, since thev existed at common
law, of which the statute is a codification. 178
Several courts of appeals have supported this view, finding that "when exigent
circumstances exist, failure to comply with [section 3109] does not render the
entry upon the premises unlawful. 179
If, indeed, exigent circumstances justify failure to comply with the notice
requirement of section 3109,180 the circumstances sufficient to qualify as an
exigency must be determined. In Agrusa the Eighth Circuit concluded that an
exigency existed in that case based upon two criteria. First, the intrusion
occurred on unoccupied business premises. This mitigated the privacy considera-
tion. Second, compliance with the notice requirement would have been
self-defeating. 18'
Both of these grounds are doubtful authority to substantiate the proposition
that the statute permits law enforcement officers to break and enter private
premises to install eavesdropping devices. In Payne v. United States,1 8 2 the Fifth
Circuit found that section 3109 has no application to the situation of an
unoccupied dwelling. The court noted that three interests are protected by
requiring an announcement and refusal of admittance prior to allowing a
174. 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
175. Id. at 699.
176. Id.
177. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
178. Id. at 591 n.8.
179. Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348, 1352 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Rodriguez
v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 607 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d
4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974).
180. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether and what exigent circumstances
would justify noncompliance with the statute. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 n.ll
(1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1963); Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958).
181. Agrusa v. United States, 541 F.2d 690, 700 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1045 (1977).
182. 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975)
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breaking and entering: prevention of violence and physical injury to police and
the occupants of the building, unexpected exposure of private activities, and
property damage from forced entry.'8 3 Since only the third interest, and in the
court's view, the least significant interest in terms of privacy, can be involved
when the occupant is absent, it is futile to require police to wait for refusal of
admittance when no one is home. The court found that logically, therefore, the
statute applies only when someone is present.1
8 4
The majority in Finazzo supported the Fifth Circuit's conclusion, finding
that the statute contemplates that officers will only attempt to serve search
warrants when occupants are present and that only a "life-endangering
situation or other perilous circumstance" excuses giving notice.'8 5 Allowing
agents to break and enter an abandoned, unoccupied building if it is necessary
to execute a search warrant'86 is quite different from permitting them to wait
until the occupants or users of a building are away so that they can forcibly
enter it to execute an electronic surveillance order.
Justification for noncompliance with section 3109 on the ground that
requiring agents to give prior notice would be self-defeating is also questionable.
The Agrusa majority relied upon Ker v. California,l" 7 in which the Supreme
Court had found that under the particular facts of that case forcible entry could
be justified by exigent circumstances. The Agrusa court, although acknowledg-
ing that none of the exigencies cited by Justice Brennan in Ker'8 s fit the facts of
the case before it, made an analogy to the destruction of evidence exigency cited
by the Court in Ker.'8 9 The constitutional principle in Ker, however, was that
forcible entry could be justified only in an exigency, not that forcible entry could
be justified when notice would be self-defeating. 90 Furthermore, the fact that
notice need not be given prior to surveillance provides authority only for the
183. Id. at 1393-94.
184. Id. at 1394.
185. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 847 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929
(1979).
186. See text accompanying notes 238 to 241 infra.
187. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
188. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, attempted to specifically define the
uniqueness concept the majority had recognized in its discussion of exigency. Brennan
found three circumstances when unannounced entry would be appropriate:
(1) persons already know of police authority and purpose;
(2) police reasonably believe persons within are in imminent danger of bodily
harm;
(3) persons within, aware of the presence of someone outside, engage in activity
to justify a belief by police that an escape or destruction of evidence is being
attempted.
Id. at 47.
Brennan's categorization was not directly disputed in Clark's plurality opinion.
The two justices differed on the question how much deference should be given to police
assessment of the potential dangers and destruction of evidence.
189. The majority in Ker equated the imminent destruction of existing evidence with
the non-creation of incriminating evidence in the future. Id. at 40.
190. See text accompanying notes 231 to 237 infra.
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incursion on conversational privacy, not for the invasion of physical privacy that
a trespassory entry entails.' 91
Thus, it is doubtful whether section 3109 has any relevance to electronic
surveillance cases. The conclusion that the statute is inapplicable to the issue of
entry to effect surveillance is supported by the legislative history of Title III.
During the debates on Title III, Senator Hugh Scott explicitly cited section
3109.192 Nevertheless, section! 3109 was not amended to authorize surreptitious
entry to install eavesdropping devices. The requirements of the statute prohibit
such entry; it is only if compliance with those requirements can be excused
under the concept of exigency that covert entry could be permitted. If an
exigency does exist, the government should be required to establish this fact,
and the court authorizing the surveillance should state both the exigency and
its permission for forcible entry explicitly in the surveillance order.
193
2. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
A final possible statutory source of authority for covert entry is rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41(b) empowers a district court to
issue law enforcement officials warrants for entering private premises to
conduct a search and seizure of property. 19 4 Rule 41(h) defines property "to
include documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects." Both of the
sections of the rule have been interpreted flexibly. In Katz the Court stated in
dicta that rule 41 is not limited to tangible items but can be given a flexible
interpretation to include electronic intrusions authorized by a judicial finding of
probable cause.1 95 This position was reiterated and extended in United States v.
New York Telephone Co.,196 in which the Court found that the authority of rule
41(b) was broad enough to include a "search" made by installing a pen register
device on a suspect's telephone line and that rule 41(h) "does not restrict or
exhaustively enumerate all the items which may be seized pursuant to Rule
41 .197
191. The Supreme Court has recognized that the exceptions to the search warrant
requirement would rarely be applicable to electronic surveillance cases. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1967).
192. 114 CONG. REC. 13200 (1968).
193. See text accompanying notes 261 to 332 infra.
194. Rule 41(b) states:
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property
that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband,
the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed
or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a
criminal offense; or (4) person for whose arrest there is a probable cause, or who is
unlawfully restrained.
195. 389 U.S. 351, 354-56 (1967). In a footnote the Court stated that the notice
requirement of rule 41(a) is not so inflexible as to require that notice always be given the
person "searched" prior to the search. Id. at 355 n.16.
196. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
197. Id. at 169. A pen register is a mechanical device used to monitor and record the
numbers dialed on a telephone. It does not intercept oral communications, nor does it
indicate whether the calls dialed are completed. Id. at 161 n.1.
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No court that has been faced with the issue whether surreptitious entry is
permissible in eavesdropping cases has found that rule 41 would allow the
issuance of a warrant authorizing covert entry. The suggestion, however, has
been made on several occasions. In Silverman v. United States,19s Justice
Douglas stated in a concurring opinion that the petitioner's conviction must be
reversed "[slince [the privacy of the home] was invaded here, and since no
search warrant was obtained as required by the Fourth Amendment and Rule
41 ... .199
Rule 41 has been contemplated as a statutory source of authority in only
three cases since the enactment of Title Ill. In United States v. Volpe,200 the
district court stated that the first issue to be resolved was whether rule 41 and
18 U.S.C. section 2518 "confer upon the Court the discretion to order a wiretap
and/or oral interception necessitating a covert entry. ... . The court,
however, failed to mention rule 41 further and confined its discussion to the
permissibility of such an order under Title 111.202
The Sixth Circuit in Finazzo failed to consider the applicability of rule 41
when it reached the conclusion that courts are without statutory power to
authorize an entry. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Celebrezze argued
that "federal district courts gain sufficient ancillary power from Rule 41 and the
All Writs Act to order surreptitious entry to implement such interceptions
wholly apart from the power to authorize such entry which exists in Title III
itself.
20 3
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Santora specifically concluded that
rule 41 was irrelevant to the issuance of Title III intercept orders. Nothing in
rule 41, the court emphasized, indicates that break-ins are permissible "absent
the full panoply of protections of the search warrant."20 4 The Santora court
indicated that pen registers, on the other hand, were permissible pursuant to
Title III. Indeed, the court noted, because pen registers do not capture any
conversation, the interception of electrical impulses by pen registers is much
less intrusive than electronic surveillance of oral communication. 20 5
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion has been countered by the argument that
rule 41 may permit a court to authorize a search that does not itself intercept a
communication, such as an entry to place a listening device, even if the rule
does not authorize the eavesdropping itself "o The fundamental flaw in this
198. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
199. Id. at 513.
200. 430 F. Supp. 931 (D. Conn. 1977), af'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 930 (1979).
201. 430 F. Supp. at 940.
202. Id. at 940-43.
203. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 852 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929
(1979). See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168-70, 172-74
(1977).
204. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 464 n.10 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
939, rev'd, 600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
205. Id.
206. Brief for Respondent, Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
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argument is that there is a significant difference between entries made prior to
conducting electronic surveillance and entries made prior to a search and
seizure of tangible objects. Indeed, the former entry is far more intrusive than is
the latter. The search for tangible evidence cannot be made without entering
the premises where the objects are located, but frequently electronic surveill-
ance of conversation can be conducted without having to enter private premises
surreptitiously. The added element of a physical intrusion aggravates the
privacy invasion occasioned by the act of listening to private conversations. 20 7 It
is thus doubtful whether any presently existing statute implicitly empowers
courts to sanction surreptitious entries.
C. Judicial Power To Authorize Break-Ins Independent of Statute
If no statute empowers judges to authorize surreptitious entry, the next
consideration is whether judges possess such a power inherently or at common
law under the fourth amendment. There are several cases involving warrantless
electronic surveillance in which an assumption seems to have been made that
courts do have non-statutory authority to issue search warrants. Such an
assumption was made by the Supreme Court in both the Katz and Osborn
decisions. The District of Columbia Circuit appears to have followed the
Supreme Court's lead in United States v. Ford.2 °s In Ford the court held that
police are required to obtain two warrants, one to conduct the surveillance and
one to break and enter. Each warrant application must be tested by traditional
fourth amendment standards of probable cause, reasonableness, and
particularity.20 9 Title III provides statutory authority for the issuance of a
warrant to conduct electronic surveillance, but the court found no statutory
authority for the issuance of a warrant authorizing breaking and entering. The
Ford court nevertheless indicated, without fully discussing the issue, that
judges have an inherent power, independent of any statute, to issue surveillance
warrants permitting forcible entry.2 10
The existence of an inherent judicial power, however, has never been
clearly established. In Finazzo, the Sixth Circuit, after tracing the history of
judicial power to issue warrants, strongly urged that courts do not possess any
inherent power to issue search warrants. 211 In 1765, an English search and
seizure case, Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers,212 first
established the principle that, except in the case of a search to recover stolen
207. See text accompanying note 245 infra.
208. 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
209. Id.
210. Cf. Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title III
provides statutory authority for breaking and entering and contains an implicit
requirement that every such entry be approved by the judge or magistrate issuing the
surveillance order).
211. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 842-44 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
929 (1979).
212. 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). See also 583 F.2d at 842-43.
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goods, the judicial power to issue a search warrant is wholly statutory. 213 The
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of Entick in Boyd v. United States.2 14 In
Boyd, the Court pointed out that the English case, which condemned the search
and seizure of private papers under a general warrant unauthorized by
Parliament, provides the original meaning and purpose of the fourth
amendment.2 15
The Boyd opinion was consistent with an existing rule, adopted by the
Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century, which limited the relation of
federal judicial power to the common law. In United States v. Hudson and
Goodwin,216 the Court was presented with the issue whether federal circuit
courts had the power to exercise common law jurisdiction in criminal cases in
addition to their jurisdiction as defined by statute. The Court concluded that no
such common law jurisdiction existed.217 From these and similar authorities, the
Finazzo court concluded that there is no inherent judicial power to issue search
warrants or to authorize law enforcement officers to break and enter in the
execution of search warrants when such means of execution have not been
authorized by statute.
Further support for this conclusion can be found in the Supreme Court's
recent decision in United States v. New York Telephone Co.218 In that case the
members of the Court unanimously agreed that the federal judicial power to
issue search warrants is not inherent but, rather, must be found in a specific
grant of legislative authority:
The principle of limited federal jurisdiction is fundamental; never is it more
important than when a federal court purports to authorize and implement
the secret invasion of an individual's privacy. . . . [Tihe history and
consistent interpretation of the federal court's power to issue search
warrants conclusively show that, in these areas, the Court's rush to achieve
a logical result must await congressional deliberation.21 9
Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, noted that the assumption of an
inherent non-statutory power was not necessary to the Supreme Court's
decisions in Katz or Osborn.220 He stated that the Court's decision in Katz may
have rested upon an interpretation of rule 41.221 Although Osborn appears to
rely in part on a non-statutory order permitting the secret recording of a
213. 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
214. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
215. Id. at 630.
216. 11 U.S. 21, 7 Cranch 32 (1812).
217. Id. at 34.
218. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
219. Id. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens and the majority were
in accord on this principle. Their disagreement revolved around whether FED. R. CRIM. P.
41 could be interpreted to authorize the use of pen registers.
220. Id. at 181 n.8.
221. Id. See text accompanying notes 194 to 197 supra.
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conversation by one who was a party to it, Justice Stevens noted the Court
subsequently made clear in United States v. White22 2 that prior judicial
authority was not a necessary element in the Osborn case. Such consensual
overhearing would not qualify as an interception under Title III. Justice Stevens
also pointed out that since the court issuing the surveillance order in Osborn
was presented with the possibility that an attorney was attempting to bribe a
witness, and thus was faced with a threat to the integrity of its own procedures,
the argument that it possessed an inherent power to authorize a non-statutory
investigation was more compelling than in the context of an ordinary criminal
investigation.2 23 There thus seems to be a firm foundation for the conclusion
that courts have no authority, except pursuant to statute, to permit law
enforcement officers to break and enter a suspect's private premises to plant an
eavesdropping device.
IV. THE REASONABLENESS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment requires that all government searches and seizures
be "reasonable, 224 including "searches" conducted pursuant to an electronic
surveillance order.2 25 In Dalia the Supreme Court expressly held that the fourth
amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the purpose of
planting otherwise legal electronic surveillance equipment. 22' The lower federal
courts were divided on this issue.
22 7
A. The Argument That Surreptitious Entry is Inherently Unreasonable
Under the general principles of fourth amendment search and seizure
procedures, forcible or covert entry in the execution of a warrant is carefully
circumscribed. Forcible entry is permissible only after a law enforcement officer
has announced his presence and those within the premises have refused to allow
his entry. 228 There are, however, a few exceptions to this proscription. Break-ins
222. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
223. 434 U.S. at 181-82 n.8.
224. See note 27 supra.
225. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 341, 353 (1967).
226. 441 U.S. at 248.
227. Compare United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344, 1346 (3d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 441
U.S. 238 (1979); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 695-98 (8th Cir. 1976)) cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977); United tates v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. 931, 942-43 (D. Conn.
1977), afrd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 930 (1979); and United
States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Md. 1976), with United States v. Finazzo, 583
F.2d 837, 845 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929 (1979); Application of the United
States, 563 F.2d 637, 644 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rowland, 448 F. Supp. 22, 24
(N.D. Tex. 1977); United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 553
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
228. See discussion of § 3109 in text accompanying notes 166 to 193 supra. This
principle has its roots in English common law. At early common law judges had no
authority to issue search warrants. Although the need to return stolen goods and to
prosecute thievery was recognized, this recognition did not extend to enabling judges to
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are permitted in a limited set of exigent circumstances when police officers are
faced with these dangers: the threat of imminent bodily harm to themselves or
those within the premises, a fleeing felon, or the threatened destruction of
evidence. 229 Entry also may be forced when the premises are vacant or
abandoned.23 ° Covert entry to execute a surveillance order is inherently
unreasonable because none of these existing exceptions provide sufficient
justification for noncompliance with the general search and seizure principles.
Furthermore, no new exceptions should be created.
1. Exigent Circumstances
The doctrine of exigent circumstances developed to provide law enforcement
officials with on-the-spot discretion to make quick decisions and enter premises
forcibly to protect themselves or persons inside, to prevent a felon from fleeing,
or to prevent the possible destruction of evidence. It seems unlikely that the
doctrine would have any application to an entry made pursuant to an electronic
surveillance order, an entry which is not made in an emergency but planned in
advance to take place when the building is unattended and the regular
occupants are not aware of the officer's presence. The Eighth Circuit, however,
found that sufficient exigencies existed in an electronic surveillance case to
justify the break-in.23 1 In United States v. Agrusa, the Eighth Circuit made an
analogy to the destruction of evidence exigency cited in Ker v. California, noting
that "whatever the likelihood might have been that Ker would have destroyed
evidence had an announcement preceded the officer's entry, it is a virtual
certainty that the defendant here would have avoided any incriminating
statement had he been told in advance that his conversations would be
intercepted.
23 2
provide a writ to search for stolen goods which could be used as evidence in a criminal
trial. Eventually, however, a common law power to issue search warrants for stolen
property arose out of the need to ensure the return of stolen goods and the arrest and
sentencing of a thief. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
Whether officers could forcibly enter the subject's home in the execution of these warrants
is questionable; if such entry were permissible it could occur only after the officers had
given notice and had been refused admittance. See 2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 114, 151 (1847). Unless otherwise authorized by statute, breaking and
entering was prohibited in other circumstances.
229. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 40-41 (1963) (opinion of Clark, J.); id. at
47 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958); Dorman V.
United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6
(1956).
230. See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
933 (1975); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3rd Cir. 1973), vacating 340 F. Supp.
454 (E.D. Pa. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
231. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045
(1977). See notes 181, 187 to 191 and accompanying text supra.
232. 541 F.2d at 697.
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The Agrusa court viewed Ker as constitutionally permitting unannounced
entries any time evidence might be destroyed if notice were to be given. The
court further relied upon and interperted dictum in Katz v. United States23 3 to
conclude that requiring notice prior to conducting electronic surveillance would
be tantamount to the destruction of evidence. If this conclusion is valid, then
Ker is dispositive.
There are several flaws, however, with this line of reasoning. The Agrusa
court found that the legitimacy of both the search and the covert entry rested
upon the same factor - justification for dispensing with the announcement
requirement. The court noted that if surveillance was permissible, any
announcement requirement was excused by the language in Katz, and the
additional element of forcible entry was therefore immaterial. The court found
that, for purposes of the fourth amendment, the addition of forcible entry to
electronic surveillance was merely a difference in the degree rather than in the
kind of intrusion.234 Under the majority's analysis, the government would never
be required to forego forcible entry, for announcement would always be
self-defeating. A warning prior to the installation of any device would satisfy
the "destruction of evidence" exigency, thereby providing a basis for permitting
an intrusion. From this conclusion it becomes apparent that the "element of
uniqueness inherent in the exigency requirement, 235 emphasized in Ker
would no longer have any significance, for a forcible entry could always be
made, even when the same evidence could be acquired by a less intrusive
method of surveillance.
The rationale of the Agrusa majority fails to recognize the particularly
intrusive nature of the eavesdrop warrant.236 Search warrants by their very
nature authorize law enforcement officials to commit a trespass. Immunity is
accorded them only because conventional searches and seizures demand
physical trespass to search for those tangible objects which are the subject of the
warrant. In some circumstances, however, electronic surveillance can be
conducted without resorting to physical trespass. For this reason, judges should
not have the power to allow a trespassory intrusion in addition to the
233. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended search.
But if Osborn [Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966)] had been told in advance
that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such
recordings would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could not have
been obtained. In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal court that
authorized electronic surveillance in Osborn simply recognized, as has this Court, that
officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized
search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the
destruction of critical evidence.
Id. at 355 n.16, citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963).
234. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 698 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1045 (1977). See Comment, supra note 169 at 591.
235. Comment, supra note 169, at 595.
236. See 24 WAYNE L. REv. 135, 142-43 (1977).
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surveillance unless there is a showing of strict necessity. The privacy interests
of the surveillance target that would be invaded by a physical entry must be
balanced against the necessity of entry. Upholding the "exigent circumstances"
analysis put forth by the Agrusa majority would ignore this balancing process
and assume that a covert entry .is necessary per se. To make such an assumption
is to look only to the notice requirement of the fourth amendment. The
realization that giving notice prior to conducting surveillance would be
self-defeating, however, provides justification only for conducting the eavesdrop-
ping without giving contemporaneous notice, not for committing a covert
breaking and entering for purposes of implementing that surveillance.23
2. Abandoned or Vacant Building
Forcible or covert entry under an eavesdropping order is more analogous to
a break and entry into a vacant building to execute a conventional search
warrant than it is to forcible entry under exigent circumstances. Forcible
entries into vacant buildings are permitted by law.238 It has been argued,
therefore, that vacant premises are less protected constitutionally than are
premises which are occupied at the time of the search;239 that "unannounced
and forcible entries into vacant premises, even homes, in order to conduct a
search, are constitutional in the absence of exigent circumstances .... ,240
237. This argument is supported by the very dictum in Katz upon which the Agrusa
majority relied. See note 214, supra, and 24 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 143-44 (1977). In Katz
the Court, in a footnote, referred to Osborn. In Osborn the Court was primarily concerned
with notice prior to surveillance in examining the validity of the judicially authorized
surveillance method used in that case. Furthermore, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967), decided shortly before Katz, the Court invalidated a New York surveillance statute
and stated:
[Tihe statute's procedure. . . has no requirement for notice . nor does it overcome
this defect by requiring some showing of special facts. On the contrary, it permits
unconsented entry without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such a showing of
exigency, in order to avoid notice, would appear more important in eavesdropping,
with its inherent dangers, than that required when conventional procedures of search
and seizure are utilized.
Id. at 60. The Katz footnote has been interpreted as dispelling any fear caused by the
Court's statement in Berger that all surveillance effectively would be barred. The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 194-95 (1968). These factors lead to the
conclusion that in Katz the Court was concerned only with the issue of notice of the
surveillance prior to the surveillance.
This conclusion in turn bolsters the contention that reliance on the Ker exigency
rationale is inappropriate when considering whether police may use forcible entry to plant
a bugging device. In light of the absence of any emergency situation requiring an
immediate police response and the irrelevance of the language in Katz, supra note 233,
there is no basis for applying the doctrine of exigent circumstances.
238. Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975)).
The Supreme Court has never expressly held that entry into unoccupied premises is
constitutional.
239. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1045 (1977).
240. Id. at 697-98.
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The holding that an otherwise permissible search need not be postponed
because the owner is absent, however, does not lead one to the broader
proposition that government agents may wait to enter secretly once the
premises have been temporarily left unoccupied and unattended. The federal
decisions holding that vacancy need not frustrate a search were decided in the
context of conventional searches for tangible evidence which would have been
completely inaccessible without an entry.241 Absent a showing that other, less
intrusive means of surveillance either have not been or will not be successful,
however, the argument that there is no alternative method of seizure cannot be
made in the eavesdropping cases.
3. The Possibility of a New Exception
Since the existing exceptions to general search and seizure principles do not
justify breaking and entering in the execution of a surveillance order, the
argument has been made that the courts should create a new exception.2 42 This
suggestion is premised upon language found in several surveillance cases in
which the Supreme Court stated that the fourth amendment principally guards
individual privacy.243 Thus, the protections of the fourth amendment are limited
only to privacy, and once police have obtained a warrant to invade a suspect's
privacy through electronic surveillance no other fourth amendment rights exist
which warrant independent constitutional protection. If this proposition is valid,
241. The argument has been made that there is a constitutional difference between the
privacy intrusion resulting from a forced entry into vacant premises and a forced entry
into occupied premises. See notes 238 to 240 and accompanying text supra. A similar
contention is that commercial premises are given less protection by the Constitution than
all homes. United State v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1045 (1977). Case law, however, does not support this distinction, but demonstrates that
the constitutionality of a search is not dependent upon whether it took place in a home or
office. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (distinguished between a
home and office on one hand and a car on the other in terms of the circumstances
justifying a warrantless search); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (held that the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment applies to administrative searches of both offices
and homes). In United States v. Ford, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Agrusa
majority's conclusion that business premises are given less constitutional protection than
is a home. 553 F.2d 146, 154 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Moreover, the Katz decision is as applicable here as it is to any theoretical
constitutional distinction between occupied and vacant premises. Although in Katz the
intercepted conversation took place in a public phone booth, the Court declared the
conversation was constitutionally protected because the petitioner had justifiably relied on
the privacy of the booth. 389 U.S. at 353. An individual's subjective privacy expectations
may be less in commercial premises than in a home, but such a finding should be made by
a court based upon the facts of the particular case before it. In light of the Katz decision,
which seems to require that the privacy considerations of the target of the surveillance be
taken into account, no blanket distinction can be made. Comment, supra note 169, at
595-98.
242. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 847 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929
(1979).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[TIhe Fourth
Amendment protects people not places.").
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the conclusion is that police can surreptitiously enter the suspect's premises to
carry out the warrant.
This argument misinterprets the significance of Katz and Berger. In these
two cases the Court extended the protections of the fourth amendment to shield
confidential speech from unreasonable surveillance as well as to safeguard the
security of homes and other buildings from physical entry.244 If the govern-
ment's analysis were to be accepted, the traditional fourth amendment
protections would have no meaning when the entry is made to enable police to
seize conversations rather than tangible objects. Quite the opposite, however, is
true. The intrusions upon one's property and privacy occasioned by an
unobserved entry io plant an eavesdropping device aggravate the privacy
intrusion caused by the surveillance itself, for "[breaking and entering . . .
intrudes upon property and privacy interests . . . which have independent
social value unrelated to confidential speech. '245 As the Sixth Circuit has
recognized:
The difference between the invasion of privacy by electronic eavesdropping
and the threat to life and property caused by the secret forcible entrance of
a live policeman are not hard to appreciate. The policeman interferes with
property which is private, he may also interfere with people who wish to be
private or their papers and effects; he may even shoot someone or be shot
himself. None of these concerns is directly related to private conversation.
All fall within the Amendment's protection.
246
If surreptitious entry infringed only upon conversational privacy it might
be reasonable to create a new exception to the standard rules governing search
and seizure. Since other protected interests are also involved, such an exception
cannot be justified.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision that Covert Entry is
Not Per Se Unreasonable
In holding that the fourth amendment does not prohibit covert entries of
private premises in all cases, the Supreme Court in Dalia relied upon
implications from previous Court decisions and from the absence of any
constitutional rule proscribing all covert entries. Justice Powell began the
discussion by citing the Court's decisions in Irvine v. California2 47 and
Silverman v. United States.2 4s In both cases, because there was no search
warrant, the Court had condemned police use of electronic surveillance devices
244. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) and
text accompanying notes 70 to 72 supra.
245. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
929 (1979).
246. Id. at 847-48 (footnote omitted).
247. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
248. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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installed after physical trespass into private premises. Powell reasoned that
these cases lead to the conclusion that "covert entries are constitutional in some
circumstances" so long as they are made pursuant to a warrant.24 9 From
the succeeding sections of the majority's opinion it becomes apparent that those
"circumstances" are deemed present whenever a magistrate has issued a
surveillance order to law enforcement officials pursuant to Title III.
The Court had determined earlier that the Title III provisions requiring
notice of the surveillance to be served on the surveillance target after the
eavesdropping had been completed was a constitutionally adequate substitute
for the typical fourth amendment requirement that advance notice of a search
be given. 210 In Dalia the Court found this provision was equally sufficient with
respect to surveillance requiring a covert entry. From that determination and
the fact that law enforcement officials may break and enter when no other
effective means to execute a warrant exist, the Court established that there can
be no constitutional basis for a rule prohibiting all covert entries in the
execution of a surveillance order.
This finding, however, does not justify the second conclusion reached by the
majority that a covert entry is reasonable any time law enforcement officials
have obtained a Title III surveillance order from a court. Breaking and entering
and other forms of covert entry are reasonable only if the surveillance cannot be
conducted without such an entry into the suspect's premises.
In conventional searches and seizures the police ordinarily can satisfy the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment by demonstrating a
reasonable belief that objects related to a crime can be found in the area to be
searched.25 ' If a search is especially intrusive, however, the government must
present an additional interest to satisfy the reasonableness requirement and to
justify the increased intrusion.2 52 Unannounced entries into occupied premises,
for instance, are permissible only when there are exigent circumstances.2 53
Similarly, intrusions on a person's body may be conducted only when the police
have a clear indication, in contrast to merely a reasonable belief, that evidence
is present. 254 Finally, the requirements of Title III make electronic surveillance
reasonable only when the law enforcement officials seeking the court order can
establish that normal investigative techniques either have failed, appear likely
to fail, or are too dangerous. 255
The increased privacy intrusion occasioned by electronic surveillance is
further heightened by the addition of forcible or covert, nonconsensual entry
preparatory to or during the surveillance. A surreptitious entry violates the
249. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247 (1979).
250. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977).
251. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
252. See Note, Covert Entry in Electronic Surveillance: The Fourth Amendment
Requirements, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 205-06 (1978).
253. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
254. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), (3)(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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property and personal security interests of the property owner and any other
persons who share the premises.2"' Privacy also is invaded if the police inspect
the premises searching for a satisfactory place to install or relocate the listening
device, or if personnel need to search for previously installed devices in order to
repair or remove them. 25 7 Moreover, once police or federal agents have gained
entry, they not only may inspect any personal papers and effects they find
within plain view,25 8 but they are also provided with an opportunity to expand
the limits of the search. With their presence in the building or room unobserved,
officers are free to make a thorough search and examine any object they find,
whether or not it is in plain view.25 9 They may wander around the premises,
stay for an indefinite period of time, and do whatever they find necessary to
implement the surveillance.
26 0
Thus, unobserved and unconsented entry adds significantly to the intrusion
caused by electronic surveillance. For this reason, covert entry by law
enforcement officials should be considered reasonable and permissible only
when less intrusive methods of surveillance are inadequate.
V. EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION FOR COVERT ENTRY
Having determined that Title Ill authorizes covert entry by law enforce-
ment officials to place, maintain, and remove eavesdropping devices, and that
such entry is not inherently unreasonable under the fourth amendment, the
remaining issue addressed by the Court in Dalia was whether the
surveillance order had to authorize such entry explicitly. The majority
concluded that a surveillance order implicitly includes authorization to put the
surveillance into effect by any means, including covert entry. An examination of
the requirements of Title III and the fourth amendment, however, reveals that
explicit authorization is mandated, although the authorization need not be
delineated precisely.
256. See notes 244 to 246 and accompanying text supra.
257. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
258. Id. Once government agents have authority to enter private premises they may
seize books, papers, and other objects that are within their plain view, assuming their
entry was reasonable and the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-70 (1971).
259. Although any evidence seized that was not discovered within plain view would be
inadmissible at trial under the exclusionary rule, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), it has been noted that it would be difficult for a
criminal defendant to sustain his burden of establishing that unobserved government
agents were engaged in illegal activities when the agents only examined forbidden objects
to obtain untraceable leads to other evidence rather than actually seizing and removing
the property from the premises. Due to this difficulty in excluding evidence, agents have
reason to extend illegally the scope of their search to papers and belongings not within
plain view. Note, supra note 252, at 208.
260. Brief for Petitioner at 20, Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
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A. The Need for Express Authorization
Several courts are in agreement with the Dalia majority's decision that the
magistrate approving a government application for surveillance need not
include a surreptitious entry provision in the eavesdropping order.261 One
argument in support of this position is that surreptitious entry for the limited
purpose of placing bugging equipment is not independently within the
protections of the fourth amendment and, therefore, any entry provision is
surplusage.
262
This rationale ignores the property and security interests at the heart of the
fourth amendment. The basic purpose of the amendment is "to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials. 263 The amendment protects people by protecting their reasonable
privacy expectations relating to both conversations and physical areas. 264
It is true, as the majority in Dalia recognized, that requiring express
authorization for covert entry is inconsistent with the warrant procedure as it is
applied in other contexts. Traditionally, the intrusion incurred by the execution
of conventional warrants is considered a single intrusion of privacy for purposes
of the fourth amendment, even though the search infringes upon the target's
interests in both the uninterrupted and private enjoyment of the property seized
and in the privacy of the premises which had contained the seized property.
Almost one hundred years ago the Supreme Court recognized that entries made
in the execution of search warrants are but "aggravating incidents of actual
search and seizure." '265 Similarly, when an officer has a valid arrest warrant and
261. See United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 903 (1978) ("[TIhe most reasonable interpretation of the orders . . . is that they
implied approval for secret entry. Any order . . . must, to be effective, carry its own
authority to make such reasonable entry as may be necessary .. "); United States v.
Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 866 (D.N.J. 1977), affd, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), affd, 441
U.S. 238 (1979) ("[Ilmplicit in the court's order is concomitant authorization for agents to
covertly enter the premises in question .. "); United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556,
560 (D. Md. 1976) ("Necessarily concomitant to and envisioned in the court order.., was
the covert installation .. "). But see Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637, 644
(4th Cir. 1977) (permission to enter surreptitiously cannot be inferred from an order
sanctioning only surveillance); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 154-55 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (surreptitious entry must be separately authorized and the provision must be
particularized to comply with the fourth amendment); United States v. Finazzo, 429 F.
Supp. 803, 806-08 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S.
929 (1979) (a separate order is required); United States v. Rowland, 448 F. Supp. 22,
24-25 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (decision whether covert entry needed should not be left to law
enforcement agencies).
262. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court rejected this
argument by the Government. Id. at 154-55.
263. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 n.27 (1967), quoted with approval
in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) and United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146,
153 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
264. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976).
265. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
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probable cause to believe the person he seeks is at home, he may enter that
person's home to make the arrest without also possessing a search warrant or
other authorization to enter.
2 66
The majority found no distinctions between the conventional warrant and
the surveillance order sufficient to justify a requirement that the latter contain
express authorization for a covert entry. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that
an entry made pursuant to carrying out a conventional warrant, however,
cannot properly be analogized to one made in order to place or to remove a
surveillance device, for the entry in the latter situation constitutes a greater
intrusion than one made in the former instance and changes the nature of the
search. The additional element of secretive physical trespass upon premises to
implement the electronic surveillance "entails an invasion of privacy of
constitutional significance distinct from, although collateral to, that which
attends the act of overhearing private conversations." 267 Indeed, such an entry
is tantamount to an independent search and seizure because bugging can be
accomplished without surreptitious entry. Eavesdropping by non-trespassory
means penetrates only the target's reasonable privacy expectations with regard
to his spoken words. However, when officers physically enter private premises
in which the target of the surveillance also has a reasonable privacy
expectation, the officers can scrutinize physical objects which would not be
disclosed to them by non-trespassory means of surveillance. Finally, because the
entry is made surreptitiously and the activities of the officers once inside the
premises are unmonitored, the intrusion in surveillance cases is more severe
than that which occurs in conventional cases.
B. Fourth Amendment Requirements for a Valid Warrant
With only a few limited exceptions, the fourth amendment requires that
searches be conducted only after officers have obtained a search warrant. Three
elements of the warrant requirement - that warrants be issued by a neutral
magistrate, be particular, and be issued only upon probable cause268 - are
important in determining whether the fourth amendment mandates the
inclusion in an eavesdropping warrant of explicit authority to break and
enter.
269
266. See, e.g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1100 (1977).
267. Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977).
268. See note 27 supra.
269. See notes 258 to 260 and accompanying text supra. The argument has been made
that even if breaking and entering requires specific authorization, trick entries do not.
United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d
1131 (9th Cir. 1974), the court found that entries gained by ruse, even if undertaken
without notice of authority and purpose, do not violate § 3109 because such entries do not
constitute a breaking and entering. From this, the government in Ford argued that a trick
entry can be likened to a consented entry, which is not subject to the warrant requirement
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In Dalia the majority held that an order to intercept conversations could be
in full compliance with these requirements without expressly noting that the
surveillance was to be accomplished by means of clandestine entry to place the
listening devices.270 The justices found nothing in either the language of the
fourth amendment or the Court's interpretations of that language requiring
that warrants contain a "specification of the precise manner" of their
execution.2 7 1 Characterizing covert entry as merely the "mode of execution"
rather than as an invasion of a separately protected privacy expectation, the
justices concluded that holding the warrant clause of the fourth amendment to
require distinct authorization of such an entry would "extend the warrant
clause to the extreme."272 A close look at the three elements of the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment reveals otherwise.
1. Issuance by a Neutral and Detached Magistrate
The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that the directive of the
fourth amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. 273 Searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or
magistrate, are with few exceptions unreasonable per se under the fourth
amendment.2 7 4 The warrant requirement of prior judicial approval was included
so that an objective mind could determine the law enforcement officials' need to
invade the right of privacy and security protected by the fourth amendment.2
The amendment directs that whenever practical, a "government search and
seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence . ..
and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to
of the fourth amendment. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). This
proposition, however, was rejected by the Phillips court:
To be valid, a consent must be intelligently and knowingly given. Before a person can
be deemed to have "knowingly" consented, he must be aware of the purpose for which
the agent is seeking entry. . . . A ruse entry, by its very nature, runs contra to the
concept of an intelligent consent of waiver.
497 F.2d at 1135 n.4.
270. In Dalia, the court order was based upon a neutral magistrate's independent
finding of probable cause to believe that Dalia was committing specifically enumerated
federal crimes, that his office was being used in connection with the commission of those
crimes, and that bugging the office would intercept oral communications relating to those
offenses. The order also set forth the exact location and dimensions of Dalia's office, and
the surveillance was restricted to the interception of oral communications of Dalia and
others concerning the enumerated offenses at Dalia's business office. 441 U.S. at 256.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 257-58.
273. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951), cited in United States v. Katz, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
274. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156
(1925). See also note 210 supra.
275. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
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justify invasion of a citizen's private premises or conversation." 276 The aim of
this requirement is to eliminate those searches where the weight and credibility
of the information presented by the complaining officer and assessed by the
magistrate is insufficient to establish probable cause to justify a search. Justice
Brennan observed that the fourth amendment tightly restricts the executing
officer within the bounds established by the warrant in order to be certain that
those searches considered necessary remain as circumscribed as possible.
Because any intrusion caused by a search and seizure is an evil, "no intrusion at
all is justified without a careful prior determination of necessity. '277
Furthermore, the particular intrusion to be made must be justified. The
police officer must possess "specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.2 78
From this, the ostensible conclusion is that the fourth amendment requires
not only that law enforcement officials obtain authorization from a magistrate
to conduct electronic surveillance, but also that they obtain authorization for
entering and trespassing upon those premises. Surveillance accompanied by
forcible entry or entry by ruse involves intrusions upon the target's privacy
expectations regarding both his spoken words and the physical premises of his
home or office. The control that the fourth amendment requires the authorizing
court to exercise exists only by having the court use its independent discretion
as to the need for covert entry after that need has been established to the court's
satisfaction by the complaining officer under oath.
This control also is mandated by Title III, even though the statute does not
explicitly require that a court separately approve an entry in addition to
sanctioning the surveillance. The argument has been made that although the
statute requires general supervision by courts, there is not even an implied
imposition upon them to supervise the practical steps of enforcement. This, it is
argued, follows from the fact that Title III, a highly detailed statute, makes no
mention of the need for a separate, explicit authorization of entry.279 The statute
requires only a particular description of the place where the communication is
to be intercepted, 28 0 not a specification by the judge issuing the order of the
installation method.
28 1
This argument overlooks several important considerations. First, if Con-
gress did not intend for Title III to authorize forcible entry implicitly, there was
no need to include in the statute a requirement that such entry be explicitly
authorized by the magistrate or judge issuing the surveillance order. In
addition, in light of the highly intrusive nature of an electronic surveillance
276. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972).
277. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
278. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
279. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
903 (1978).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Similarly, id. § 2518(l)(b).
281. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
903 (1978) (Gurfein, J., concurring).
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search and seizure, the court should be able to establish some controls upon the
methods by which law enforcement officers carry out the surveillance orders.
This was recognized in the congressional findings on electronic surveillance:
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or
oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has
consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a
court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the control and
supervision of the authorizing court.282
Thus, unless an exception to the warrant requirement can be found to be
present in surveillance cases, the fourth amendment requirement of a neutral
predetermination 283 of the scope of a search mandates explicit judicial
authorization for forcible entry. In United States v. Scafidi,2s 4 the Second Circuit
created a new exception to the fourth amendment provisions, reasoning that the
judge or magistrate issuing the surveillance order lacks the requisite expertise
to specify what manner of execution would be appropriate in a particular set of
circumstances. 28 5 The court found that it would be naive to impute to a district
judge the familiarity with the installation of bugging devices or the premises in
which they are to be installed that would be necessary for him to be able to
specify a method of entry, the proper location of the bug, and the steps necessary
to be certain it would function properly.28 6 Once a court is convinced of the need
for electronic surveillance, the appropriate law enforcement agency should
dictate the precise means for carrying out the judge's order. It would be an
invasion of the province of law enforcement agencies for a court to make such a
decision. The court would be assuming its competence to be greater than that of
282. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 211 (1968).
283. In Ford, the D.C. Circuit concluded that post-entry review would be inappropri-
ate, finding the logic of the Supreme Court when it rejected post-surveillance review
applicable to the trespassory aspect of surveillance. The Court had stated that
"post-surveillance review would never reach the surveillances which failed to result in
prosecutions. Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested means
of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights." United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (citations omitted), quoted in United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146,
161 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The D.C. Circuit noted that both Title III and the parallel provisions of the D.C.
Code allow individual conversations to be seized without a prior determination by a
magistrate that they are covered by the order authorizing the surveillance. Upon
termination of the surveillance, if it is challenged, a reviewing court decides whether
particular conversations were seized illegally. The court found that this procedure was
similar to post-search examination of whether police had exceeded the authority of a
conventional warrant by seizing items not particularly described, and that it did not
dispose of the fourth amendment's requirement that there be prior judicial authorization
based on probable cause for an official intrusion on private premises. 553 F.2d at 167.
284. 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978).
285. Id. at 640.
286. Id.
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the agents who presumably are proficient in their field. Furthermore, a
court-specified order would carry with it the risk of illegality if there should be
any deviations from its specifications.2 s7
This argument, however, fails to consider the issue properly. When
determining whether a general exception to the warrant requirement is
justified, the issue to be resolved is whether authority to enter "should be
evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search."2" The contention that courts lack the expertise necessary to assess
adequately the various methods of entry and installation leads not only to the
conclusion that the warrant requirement should be abandoned, but also to the
conclusion that courts are inherently incapable of determining the need for
electronic surveillance and the reasonableness of police action taken pursuant to
installing or maintaining surveillance devices. 28 9 Courts repeatedly must face
and rule upon the most difficult issues facing society. They are capable of
determining the need for surreptitious entry pursuant to planting or maintain-
ing an eavesdropping device, and their authorization acknowledging this
method of surveillance need not be drawn with exactitude.
290
2. Probable Cause
In addition to requiring judicial authorization of the need for electronic
surveillance, the warrant clause requires that such authorization be given only
upon a showing of probable cause. 291 This requirement is coextensive with the
government's responsibility to establish the reasonableness of a search prior to
its execution. Under the traditional interpretation of probable cause, the
government must demonstrate a reasonable belief that the search will reveal
the "'place of concealment of evidence of [a] crime."' 292 One commentator has
pointed out that this traditional standard imposes no duty upon police to justify
in advance the reasonableness of covert entry, for its use affects neither the
place nor the criminal relevance of the objects of the eavesdropping. 293 However,
287. The court assumed that explicit judicial authorization would have to be highly
specific; the judge would have to consult with agents on the best possible method of entry,
perhaps visit the premises, and include in the order explicit directions as to how to
proceed. Id. Officers' need for flexibility in the time, manner, and method of entry was also
stressed in McNamara, supra note 99, at 2-4, 15.
288. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967), quoted in United States v.
Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
289. 553 F.2d at 162.
290. See text accompanying notes 329 to 331 infra.
291. See note 37 supra.
292. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977).
293. Note, supra note 252, at 210.
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it has been suggested that there also exists a flexible probable cause standard
which subjects particularly intrusive searches to a more stringent test.294
This flexible probable cause test was first adopted by the Supreme Court in
Camara v. Municipal Court,295 a. civil case in which the Court approved the
balancing of "the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails."2 96 This analysis was first extended to a criminal search in Terry v.
Ohio,297 in which the Court upheld a policeman's search of a person whom he
reasonably believed to be armed, dangerous, and engaged in criminal activity.
The Court found that although the officer had had less than traditional probable
cause for this belief, the protection of third parties and police outweighed the
intrusion. 298 Although in Terry the Court considered the issue of flexible
probable cause in the context of a warrantless search, its dictum in United
States v. United States District Court 299 extended this balancing approach to
surveillance orders issued for criminal cases involving domestic security.
The flexible probable cause test could extend to the evaluation of a warrant
obtained in the investigation of an ordinary crime. 300 The Court's requirement
in Berger that the government must demonstrate exigency before it may obtain
an order for electronic surveillance established that the traditional probable
cause standard not only can be relaxed as it was in Camara and Terry, but also
can become more rigorous when the search is particularly intrusive.30 1
Some exceptionally intrusive searches, such as those occurring in exigent
circumstances, cannot be subjected to standards of pre-search justification more
stringent than those traditionally imposed.30 2 When prior justification is
possible, however, there should be a balancing of "the burden on law
enforcement officials against the fulfillment of the functions performed by the
process of prior justification. '" 30 3
One such function of the process of prior justification is the imposition of the
judgment of a neutral magistrate for that of an interested policeman regarding
the justifiability of effectuating the surveillance order by means of a covert
entry.304 Furthermore, the additional burden that prior justification for covert
294. Id.
295. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
296. Id. at 537.
297. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
298. Id. at 21-22.
299. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
300. See Note, supra note 252, at 212.
301. Id. There is also evidence of a more restrictive probable cause test in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the Court suggested that before a search could
intrude into a body there must be a clear indication of, as opposed to a reasonable belief in,
the presence of the objects being sought.
302. Exigent circumstances, by definition, arise only at the moment of search. See
Note, supra note 252, at 214.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 215-16; notes 265 to 293 and accompanying text supra. A second
function of prior justification, the avoidance of a post-search determination of reasonable-
ness in which the factual issues are distorted by hindsight, is not served. The after-the-fact
[VOL. 39
BREAKING AND ENTERING
entry would place on the government seems slight. Because officials must
always obtain a court order before they can conduct surveillance, the added
burden of providing prior justification for a covert entry adds only to the
paperwork involved in making an application for a surveillance order. It does
not necessitate an additional trip to the magistrate, which would cause a further
delay in gathering evidence of a crime.
30 5
Even if a more stringent test of probable cause is not required, both Berger
and Title III mandate that the showing of probable cause to search and the
intrusion permitted in the surveillance order be coextensive. A showing of
probable cause for an invasion of conversational privacy does not validate the
necessity for trespassory entries. As the District of Columbia Circuit has pointed
out, when two separate invasions of protected privacy exist, the incursion is
greater than from either one alone.
30 6
Further support for the proposition that the scope of the intrusion permitted
and the demonstration of probable cause must be coextensive can be found in
the legislative history of section 2518(4)(b) of Title 111.307 The legislative history
of this section, which has been interpreted as an indication of congressional
intent to allow surreptitious entries, 30 8 contains a reference to Steele v. United
States,3 °9 in which the Supreme Court established that the probable cause
showing determines the scope of privacy invasion to be permitted. 310
Thus, whether the showing of probable cause is tested by a flexible standard
or by the premise that the invasions authorized by the warrant should have the
same scope as the probable cause to search justifies, the probable cause
requirement of the fourth amendment mandates prior justification to the court
of the need to break and enter, and explicit recognition by the court of that need.
3. The Particularity Requirement
The warrant clause of the fourth amendment also contains a requirement
that a warrant "particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized., 311 This clause mandates that the language of the warrant
be the sole source of authority that the executing officer has for the search. 312
justification of the surreptitious entry may be of a technical nature which is obviously
attributable to what was known about the premises or the target of the search before the
surveillance order was obtained. Note, supra note 252, at 215.
305. Id.
306. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 168 n.62 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
307. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2112, 2192.
308. See text accompanying notes 105 to 107 supra.
309. 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
310. The case also has been cited for the proposition that a warrant is overbroad if it
allows entries more extensive than can be justified by the demonstrated cause. See
generally text accompanying notes 326 to 332 infra.
311. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. See note 37 supra.
312. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Mascolo, Specificity Requirements for Warrants Under the Fourth
Amendment Defining the Zone of Privacy, 73 DICK. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1968).
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Therefore, there must be express authorization in a surveillance order for
surreptitious entry into private premises. This rule prevents the officer from
overestimating his scope of authority and from looking outside the warrant for
indications of the limits of his search. It has been suggested that because the
boundaries and scope of the search are changed by the added intrusion of a
covert entry to electronic surveillance, the court issuing the eavesdropping order
must be given the opportunity to decide whether entry is justified in a
particular case. 313 Since the scope of the search is limited to what is authorized
in the warrant plus any supplementary information specifically incorporated by
reference into it,314 the fact that the judge or magistrate issuing the surveillance
order may have actual knowledge that the surveillance may involve a covert
entry315 is insignificant unless that knowledge is incorporated into the
surveillance order.
The argument has been made that if the surveillance order particularly
describes the premises where the surveillance will take place, establishes the
existence of probable cause to eavesdrop, provides a description of the specific
offenses of which evidence is sought, and allows for interceptions to be made for
only a limited time, the requirements of both Title III and the fourth
amendment have been met.3 16 Such a warrant would comply with the
traditional interpretation of particularity, for the particularity clause was added
to the fourth amendment to prevent general, rummaging searches.317 If the
order is so detailed as to include all of the above information it could not be
considered a general warrant, and the search is not a general one if the officers
enter solely for the purpose of effectuating the surveillance order. 31s
The flaw in this argument is that traditional approaches to search and
seizure questions are not always applicable to searches and seizures conducted
by electronic surveillance. With its statement in Katz that the fourth
amendment applies to people and not places, 319 the Supreme Court expanded
the reach of the amendment, and consequently, of the particularity clause. The
scope of the amendment cannot turn upon whether or not the police made a
rummaging search. "'It is the individual's interest in privacy which the
Amendment protects, and that would not appear to fluctuate with the "intent"
of the invading officers.' "32o
313. See text accompanying notes 273 to 299 supra.
314. Mascolo, supra note 312, at 12.
315. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 575 F.2d 1344, 1346 n.3 (3d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 441
U.S. 238 (1979).
316. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
903 (1978) (Gurfein, J., concurring).
317. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 478-80 (1976); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965).
318. United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Md. 1976).
319. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
320. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 649 n.173 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976) (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
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In light of Katz, the particularity clause should protect people and their
privacy and limit all aspects of a search to what has been justified by a showing
of probable cause. 32' Because a covert entry to effectuate electronic surveillance
adds appreciably to the intrusiveness of the search, and because interception
need not always be implemented by a covert entry, 322 the particularity clause
mandates that surreptitious entry be specifically authorized in the surveillance
order.
The fourth amendment requirements that a warrant issue only upon
probable cause, particularity, and approval by a neutral magistrate demonstrate
singularly and collectively that due to the highly intrusive nature of trespassory
entry incident to electronic surveillance, such entry must be expressly
authorized. A corollary to those requirements, the least intrusive means test,
323
also supports this conclusion. This test, which commands that the issuing court
seek to minimize the privacy intrusion caused by a surreptitious entry,
frequently results in the court's finding that the surveillance should be
accomplished by means of a wiretap rather than by installing a listening device
on private premises.3 24 If, however, the judge determines that the surveillance
should be implemented by means of a surreptitious entry, he must ensure that
the invasion occasioned by the entry is the least intrusive one possible. This is
impossible when the authorization to enter is implicit, for by definition such an
authorization places no limitations upon the number or manner of entries. By
contrast, explicit authorization gives citizens the knowledge that the eavesdrop-
ping is limited to the "narrowest precise point" necessary for the law
enforcement officials to accomplish their purpose, and that the reasons for
physical intrusion upon their privacy are included in public records and may be
reviewed by a court whenever the surveillance results in a prosecution. 325
C. The Form of Express Authorization
When a magistrate determines that a trespassory entry is warranted, the
surveillance order should include separate, express authorization for each
surreptitious entry to be made. The order need not specify the manner or time of
day of each entry. The fourth amendment commands that an intrusion on
private premises have prior valid authorization based upon sufficient probable
cause. 326 In Berger, the Supreme Court strongly criticized those provisions of the
New York Statute that authorized" the equivalent of a series of intrusions,
searches and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause." 327 In
321. See text accompanying notes 291 to 310 supra.
322. See Note, supra note 252, at 219-20.
323. This requirement was expressly addressed in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
53-60 (1967).
324. Comment, supra note 169, at 605-06. See also 31 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1067-68
(1978).
325. United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 885 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 146
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
326. See text accompanying notes 291 to 310 supra.
327. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 41, 59 (1967).
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accord with the mandate of the fourth amendment as expressed in Berger, Title
III requires that demonstration of probable cause be coextensive with the
intrusion allowed by the court.32 Affidavits submitted by law enforcement
officials in support of their applications for court authorization, therefore,
should allege facts, which if true, would demonstrate that non-trespassory
methods of electronic surveillance would not be successful and that the
conversations can be seized only following trespassory entry into private
premises to plant a listening device. Only if that first entry is inadequate for
some reason can the government show the need for additional covert entries.
Similarly, should the government apply for an extension of the original
surveillance order, the court must decide anew if a trespass might be necessary.
Although there must be specific authorization of each trespassory entry, it
has been recognized that the manner and time of entry need not be delineated
expressly. 329 It is doubtful that one method of entry would be more intrusive
than another provided there is no injury to any person who owns or uses the
premises and no major damage to the premises. 33' Traditionally, courts have not
found that a warrant must specify the time of day of entry.331 Any indications
that conventional searches conducted at night are more intrusive than their
daylight counterparts have rested on the offensiveness of rousing the occupants
of the premises to be searched in order to provide them with notice of the
search.332 In electronic surveillance, however, where pre-search notice is not a
factor, and where entry is usually attempted when the premises are vacant, this
consideration becomes irrelevant.
Thus, the Dalia majority's fears are unfounded that requiring an express
statement in a surveillance order to allow covert entry would be the equivalent
of specifying the precise manner of execution. Consistent with the fourth
328. This is indicated in the legislative history of Title III:
Where it is necessary to obtain coverage to only one meeting, the order should not
authorize additional surveillance.. . . Where a course of conduct embracing multiple
parties and extending over a period of time is involved, the order may properly
authorize proportionately longer surveillance, but in no event for longer than 30 days,
unless extensions are granted.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, reprinted in [1968[ U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2190. And again: "As with initial orders, extensions must be related in time to
the showing of probable cause .... Otherwise there is a danger that the showing of
probable cause and the additional information in the application will become stale." Id. at
103, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2192.
The D.C. Circuit found that these sections, although dealing with the seizure of
conversations rather than entries, rebut any argument that Congress planned to change
the traditional fourth amendment rule that the demonstration of probable cause must
match the intrusion authorized. United States v. London, 553 F.2d 146, 166-67 n.63 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
329. Note, supra note 252, at 221-22.
330. Id. The dangers of discovery and confrontation apply to both forcible entry and
entry by ruse. Id. at 221 n.133.
331. Id. at 221-22. See also Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 454-57 (1974).
332. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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amendment's requirements, the warrant must only state that a covert entry to
place or remove electronic surveillance equipment can be made; the procedural
details can be left to the agents who will be conducting the surveillance.
Finally, to demand that magistrates grant express authority to break and
enter would not "promote empty formalism" as the majority argued. Because
surveillance may be accomplished by less drastic means than a physical
invasion of the target's home or office, requiring law enforcement officials to
obtain prior judicial approval of covert entries might serve to prevent
unnecessary and improper intrusions.
Conclusion
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dalia v. United States, case law on
the issue of the permissibility of surreptitious entry incident to electronic
surveillance was in disarray, with little common thread of analysis. The Court's
decision has put an end to further conflict among the circuits. However, the
majority opinion is highly unsatisfactory in that it brushed over several aspects
of the basic questions with which the Court was faced and failed to conform to
traditional concepts of fourth amendment protections. Notwithstarding the
majority's conclusion, it is questionable whether any existing statute implicitly
authorizes surreptitious entry to install an eavesdropping device.
If such entries are justifiable, they should be permitted only under limited
conditions, for they add an element of intrusion to a method of search and
seizure that is already more intrusive than conventional searches and seizures.
Forcible entry adds to the intrusion on privacy attendant to eavesdropping by
providing additional potential for police abuse, by offending society's sense of
security, and by enabling the government to engage in bugging, the most
offensive form of electronic surveillance. This increased invasion of privacy
becomes constitutionally significant in light of the concern that a search take
place by the least intrusive means possible. Surreptitious entry should be
allowed only when the judge issuing the surveillance order is apprised of the
planned entry, determines that non-trespassory interception has not been or
will not be successful, and explicitly authorizes such an entry in a way that does
not offend the substantive requirements of the fourth amendment. This
approach would accommodate reasonably the enforcement of criminal law and
the fourth amendment rights of citizens whose privacy is invaded by electronic
surveillance.
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